G.R. Nos. L-44555-56, May 14, 1990
Edilberto Munsayac and Nena Munsayac, petitioners, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XV and Leonor P. Enriquez, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Leonor P. Enriquez filed two criminal cases for theft against an accused, involving jewelries and gold coins. During the proceedings, she executed an affidavit of desistance and manifested her intention to file a separate civil action to recover the stolen properties. Consequently, the respondent judge dismissed the criminal cases. On the same day, private respondent’s counsel filed a “Reservation of Right to Demand Restitution” citing People v. Alejano. Subsequently, she filed a Motion for Restitution directly in the dismissed criminal cases, praying for an order requiring petitioners Edilberto and Nena Munsayac to return specific sums of money.
Petitioners opposed the motion, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction to grant damages in the dismissed criminal cases and that the proper recourse was a separate civil action. Despite this, the respondent judge issued an order requiring petitioners to file their answers to the motion for restitution. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting them to file this certiorari petition, alleging grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order requiring the petitioners to answer a motion for restitution filed in criminal cases that had already been dismissed upon the complainant’s desistance.

RULING

Yes, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the challenged order. The legal logic is anchored on the procedural consequences of the dismissal of the criminal cases based on the complainant’s desistance. The civil liability for the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, but its existence is dependent on the continuation of the criminal case. Here, the dismissal was not a judgment on the merits but was effected at the instance of the private respondent before trial even commenced. This dismissal carried with it the dismissal of the civil aspect of the case.
The case of People v. Alejano, which allows restitution even after acquittal, is inapplicable. Alejano and similar precedents involved a trial on the merits where the court ascertained the facts, whereas here, there was no trial. The mere filing of criminal informations is not proof that the crimes were committed. Since there was no conviction, restitution cannot be ordered in the criminal cases. The private respondent’s reservation to file a separate civil action was uncalled for in this context, as the desistance effectively waived the civil action impliedly instituted. The proper remedy for private respondent to recover her properties is to file an entirely new and independent civil action, not to seek restitution in the already dismissed criminal proceedings. The respondent judge’s order effectively revived a civil aspect in non-existent cases, which is not sanctioned by the rules.