In April 1905, Juana Pichay (plaintiff-appellee) conveyed an undivided one-third interest in twenty-five parcels of land to Eulalio Querol, et al. (defendants-appellants) to settle a debt of P1,500. The contract of conveyance included a clause stating that Pichay had “requested may said creditors to allow me to enjoy the usufruct of the same until my death, notwithstanding the fact that I have conveyed the said lands to them in payment of my debt, and I bind myself not to sell, mortgage, or leave the said lands as inheritance to any person.”
The defendants claimed this clause was merely a request for usufruct and did not constitute an actual grant. On August 10, 1905, the co-owners of the twenty-five parcels of land, without Pichay’s participation, conducted a partition, assigning specific tracts to the defendants as their one-third share. The defendants took possession of these tracts and refused to acknowledge Pichay’s right of usufruct.
In February 1907, Pichay filed an action seeking a declaration of her right of usufruct, the right to administer the lands, and payment of rents received by the defendants. The lower court ruled that Pichay had the right to administer all lands, had a right of usufruct over one-third of the lands until her death, that the partition could not affect her, and ordered Querol to deliver two crops, while also sentencing Pichay to indemnify Querol P300.
ISSUE:
1. Did the clause in the contract effectively grant Juana Pichay a right of usufruct?
2. If a right of usufruct was granted, how does a subsequent partition of the common property among co-owners affect the usufructuary’s rights?
3. Was the lower court correct in granting Juana Pichay the right to administer all lands and the specific amount of crops?
RULING:
The Supreme Court, in its decision on October 1, 1908, held that the clause in the contract unequivocally granted Juana Pichay the right of usufruct until her death. The Court reasoned that the only purpose for inserting the clause was to secure this right, and the form of words used was insufficient to defeat this clear intention.
Regarding the partition, the Court ruled that, under Article 490 of the Civil Code, a usufructuary of part of a thing held in common, upon the cessation of the community due to division, shall have the usufruct of the specific part awarded to the owner or co-owner. Therefore, Pichay’s usufructuary right now pertained to the specific tracts of land assigned to the defendants in the partition of August 10, 1905, and the lower court erred in stating the partition could not affect her.
The Court also found no support in the record for Pichay’s claim to administer all the lands described in the complaint. As for the crops, the Court recalculated the amount due to Pichay based on the agreed facts for the 1906 and 1907 crops. The P300 indemnity against Pichay was upheld as she failed to present a bill of exceptions regarding that point.
The judgment of the lower court was reversed. The case was remanded with directions to enter judgment declaring Juana Pichay entitled to the right of usufruct in the lands assigned to the defendants by the partition of August 10, 1905, and to enter a judgment against Pichay and in favor of Eulalio Querol for P149.48.
