G.R. No. L-44301 February 26, 1988
MERARDO A. VELASQUEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ROMEO D. MAGAT, etc., and RICARDO CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Merardo Velasquez owned a rice land formerly tenanted by Emetrio Fabros. On August 21, 1972, they executed a compromise agreement terminating the tenancy, stipulating that Fabros would surrender the land on December 31, 1972, after harvesting the standing crop. Fabros complied, delivering possession to Velasquez in December 1972. Velasquez then engaged Felipe Alcantara and Tadeo to cultivate the land. In August 1973, respondent Ricardo Cruz, Fabros’ son-in-law, entered the land and planted palay. Velasquez demanded he vacate, and upon refusal, filed a forcible entry case in the Municipal Court.
The Municipal Court, after a referral to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) which certified no tenancy relationship existed, tried the case and ruled for Velasquez. It found Cruz unlawfully entered months after Fabros’ tenancy ended, and there was no evidence Cruz was ever Fabros’ farm helper or household member. Cruz appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). The CFI dismissed the complaint, holding it lacked jurisdiction. It ruled the compromise agreement showed a tenancy relationship subject to a “future surrender,” thus the case was agrarian in nature and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the forcible entry case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that an agrarian tenancy relationship existed between the parties.

RULING

Yes, the CFI decision is reversed. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. Velasquez’s complaint alleged a simple case of forcible entry by a trespasser, Cruz, after lawful possession was obtained from the former tenant. The CFI’s finding of tenancy was erroneous. The compromise agreement between Velasquez and Fabros was a clear, voluntary surrender of the landholding, effective December 1972. Fabros’ continued possession until that date to harvest his crop did not create a “resolutory condition” or re-establish tenancy; it merely allowed him to enjoy the fruits of his prior labor before the termination took full effect. His actual surrender of possession confirmed the agreement’s validity. Cruz, claiming to be Fabros’ farm helper, had no privity of contract with Velasquez. Any right he might have had was derivative from and extinguished with Fabros’ tenancy. His entry in August 1973 was a clear act of forcible entry against Velasquez, who was then in prior physical possession. The DAR’s certification and the Municipal Court’s factual findings, which showed no tenancy relationship, were correct. Therefore, the Municipal Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Its decision ordering Cruz to vacate and pay damages is reinstated.