G.R. No. L-44240. May 5, 1979.
Fredeswinda R. Casanova, petitioner, vs. The Hon. Mariano A. Lacsamana, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Pasay City Court, Branch II, The Spouses Jose V. Ochoa and Elena Vergel, The Sheriff of Pasay City and The Engineer of Pasay City, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Jose V. Ochoa filed an ejectment case against petitioner Fredeswinda R. Casanova in the Pasay City Court. The court rendered a judgment on the pleadings in favor of Ochoa on March 5, 1976, ordering Casanova to vacate the premises, pay accrued rentals and damages, and attorney’s fees. The decision became final and executory. Subsequently, Ochoa filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of an Order of Demolition concerning Casanova’s house on the property.
The respondent Judge, on July 8, 1976, issued an order granting the motion and directed the Sheriff to demolish and remove Casanova’s house. The Deputy Sheriff then notified Casanova that her house would be demolished on July 30, 1976. Casanova moved for reconsideration and suspension of execution, citing General Order No. 53, but this was denied. She then filed the present petition, arguing that the demolition order was issued without the formal hearing and without granting her a reasonable time to remove the improvements as required by Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of demolition without conducting a due hearing and without fixing a reasonable time for the petitioner to remove her house, in violation of Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the demolition order and the sheriff’s notice. The Court clarified that while the underlying ejectment judgment was final and executory, the specific order for the demolition of improvements erected by the judgment debtor is governed by a separate, specific procedural rule designed as a safeguard. Section 14, Rule 39 explicitly mandates that the court shall not order the destruction, demolition, or removal of such improvements except upon a special order issued after a petition by the judgment creditor, after due hearing, and after the judgment debtor has failed to remove them within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
The respondent Judge failed to comply with this mandatory procedure. The order of demolition was issued without conducting the required “due hearing” on the motion for demolition. Furthermore, the order did not fix any reasonable period within which Casanova could voluntarily remove her house before forcible demolition. This procedural lapse constituted a denial of due process. The Court, citing Folloso v. Director of Lands and Rom v. Cobadora, emphasized that the requirement of a hearing and the grant of a reasonable time are not empty formalities but essential safeguards to protect the judgment debtor’s interest in the improvements. The respondent Judge was ordered to conduct a formal hearing and accord petitioner a reasonable time to remove her house in accordance with Section 14, Rule 39.