FACTS:

Defendant Vicente Garcia Gavieres was charged in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila with “calumniating, outraging, and insulting by word of mouth, and in his presence, a public official, an agent of the authorities, in the exercise of his office,” punishable under Article 257 of the Penal Code.

During the CFI proceedings, Gavieres pleaded “not guilty” and moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that he had already been convicted and fined P25 for the same acts in the municipal court, thus putting him twice in jeopardy. The CFI denied this motion, stating that double jeopardy was a matter of proof during trial.

During the trial, Gavieres admitted to the facts but claimed the insults were directed at Mr. Crame as an individual, not as Captain Crame. He also stated he had been arrested, tried, and fined P25 in the municipal court, but offered no further proof of this conviction or the specific offense. The record, however, included a municipal court complaint charging Gavieres with violating Section 2 of Ordinance No. 28 of Manila, which penalizes behaving in a “drunken, boisterous, rude, or indecent manner in any public place.”

The CFI found Gavieres guilty under Article 257 of the Penal Code and sentenced him to four months of arresto mayor. Gavieres appealed, primarily asserting that he had been placed twice in jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether a conviction under a municipal ordinance for boisterous or rude behavior, arising from the same acts, constitutes double jeopardy and bars a subsequent prosecution under the Penal Code for insulting a public official.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the CFI’s judgment.

The Court held that the two offensesviolating Section 2 of Ordinance No. 28 (behaving in a drunken, boisterous, rude, or indecent manner) and insulting a public official under Article 257 of the Penal Codeare separate and entirely distinct offenses, even if they resulted from the same acts.

The Court reiterated the doctrine that the mere fact that a person is prosecuted twice by different governmental entities for different offenses resulting from the same acts does not justify a plea of former jeopardy. An act may be a penal offense under the laws of the State (Penal Code) and also incur penalties under a municipal ordinance; the enforcement of one penalty does not preclude the enforcement of the other by the respective governmental entity.

The Court distinguished the present case from Grafton v. United States, explaining that Grafton applied when two tribunals (e.g., civil and military courts) derived their authority from the same government (the United States). In contrast, this case involves distinct governmental entities: the State (through the Penal Code) and the Municipality (through its ordinances), each exercising jurisdiction over different offenses, even if they arise from the same factual incident. Therefore, the Grafton decision was not extended to cases like the present.

The Court concluded that the complaint in the lower court was sufficient, and the conviction was proper.