G.R. No. L-43105 and L-43190, August 31, 1984
Republic of the Philippines (Director of Lands) and Aurora Bautista, et al., petitioners, vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals and Santos del Rio, respondents.

FACTS

Santos del Rio applied for the registration of a 17,311-square-meter parcel of land in Pila, Laguna, near the shore of Laguna de Bay. He derived his claim from a 1909 deed of sale executed in favor of his father, Benedicto del Rio, with tax declarations and payments dating back to 1918. The Director of Lands opposed, alleging the land was part of the public domain, either as a lake bed or foreshore land. Private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L-43190, also opposed, claiming they had reclaimed the land by dumping duck egg shells and had possessed it for over twenty years. The trial court dismissed the application, but the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered registration in favor of del Rio.
The private oppositors had obtained permission from del Rio to construct duck houses on the land, with some making voluntary rental payments. They later built residential houses, prompting del Rio to file an ejectment suit. During 1965-1966, the private oppositors filed sales applications with the Bureau of Lands and opposed del Rio’s registration application.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) whether the land is public domain and thus unregisterable, and (2) whether del Rio has established a registerable title.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, ruling the land is not part of the public domain and that del Rio possesses a registerable title. The Court held that for a land to be considered part of a lake bed under the Law of Waters of 1866, it must be covered by water at its “highest ordinary depth,” interpreted as the regular level during the dry season. The inundation of the subject land for four to five months during the rainy season is caused by rains, not the ordinary lake level, thus it is not part of Laguna de Bay’s bed. It also cannot be classified as foreshore land, defined as that alternately covered and uncovered by the sea’s ordinary tides, as the seasonal flooding is not tidal.
Regarding the private oppositors’ claim, their alleged reclamation without government authority cannot confer ownership. Their possession was permissive, as tenants of del Rio, and not in the concept of an owner; therefore, it cannot ripen into ownership by prescription. Del Rio’s evidence of a valid 1909 title, coupled with tax declarations and payments, satisfactorily established his registerable title. The application for registration was granted.