G.R. No. L-42447 August 30, 1982
PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. SERAFIN E. CAMILON, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII; THE CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA; and STEEL DISTRIBUTORS, INC., respondents.

FACTS

In Civil Case No. 9205, the Court of First Instance rendered a judgment on August 24, 1968, ordering defendants Co Ban Ling & Sons, Co Chin Leng, and Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff Steel Distributors, Inc. the sum of P35,760.00 with interest and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals later modified the decision, specifying that the liability of appellant Co Chin Leng was only joint, pro rata, and subsidiary, but otherwise affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Subsequently, the judgment creditors moved for a writ of execution, which the respondent judge issued, including petitioner Pioneer Insurance as an object thereof.
Pioneer Insurance filed a motion to quash the writ of execution as to it, invoking Section 17, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, which pertains to the liability on a counterbond filed to discharge an attachment. The petitioner argued that its liability under its counterbond was limited. The respondent judge denied the motion, ruling that under the final and executory judgment, Pioneer’s liability was adjudged to be joint and several with the principal debtor.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of execution against petitioner Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation is proper despite its claim that the rule on excussion under Section 17, Rule 57 should apply to limit its liability as a surety on a counterbond.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the validity of the writ of execution against the petitioner. The Court ruled that the rule of excussion under Section 17, Rule 57, which petitioner invokes, is not applicable in the instant case. That procedural rule, which allows a summary hearing to determine the surety’s liability on an attachment bond, governs proceedings prior to final judgment. Here, there is already a final and executory judgment that specifically sentenced the bondsman, Pioneer Insurance, to be jointly and solidarily liable with the principal debtor for a liquidated sum.
The Court cited the precedent in Luzon Steel Corporation vs. Sia, which established that when a final judgment has already ascertained the surety’s solidary liability, execution can issue directly against the surety without need for a separate summary hearing under Rule 57. The judgment itself has conclusively determined the nature and extent of the surety’s obligation. Therefore, the respondent judge correctly ordered the execution against Pioneer Insurance based on the final judgment. The Supreme Court lifted the restraining order, but noted the dismissal was without prejudice to petitioner’s right to recover from its co-judgment debtor whatever it pays under the writ. Justice Aquino dissented, arguing petitioner was entitled to a summary hearing on the amount of its liability.