G.R. No. L-42366 December 15, 1982
PAULINA MARGATE, et al., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SEBASTIAN TOLANG, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Private respondents filed an action for partition against petitioners. The Court of First Instance rendered a decision on October 10, 1974. Petitioners received a copy on October 14, 1974. To perfect their appeal, petitioners filed their notice of appeal and served a copy on adverse counsel on October 25, filed the Record on Appeal in court on November 3, and filed the appeal bond on November 5, all within the reglementary period. However, they admittedly failed to serve a copy of the Record on Appeal on the adverse party’s counsel within that period, doing so only belatedly by registered mail. The trial court approved the Record on Appeal on January 17, 1975, without opposition.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. On August 8, 1975, private respondents moved to dismiss the appeal due to late service of the Record on Appeal copy. The appellate court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal in a Resolution dated September 16, 1975, ruling that the appeal had lapsed due to this failure. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal solely for their failure to serve a copy of the Record on Appeal on the adverse party’s counsel within the reglementary period.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court set aside the appellate court’s resolutions and remanded the case for proceedings on the merits. The legal logic is that while the Court of Appeals has discretion to dismiss an appeal, such discretion must be soundly exercised in accordance with justice and fair play. Here, the core requirements for perfecting an appeal were indisputably met: the notice of appeal, appeal bond, and Record on Appeal were all timely filed in court. The procedural lapse was merely in the delayed service of a copy of the Record on Appeal.
This technical lapse was excusable. No substantial right of the adverse party was prejudiced, as they were eventually furnished a copy and never challenged the Record on Appeal’s accuracy, leading to its unopposed approval by the trial court. The trial court’s order of approval constituted a finding of the appeal’s timeliness, which was not impugned. Furthermore, petitioners demonstrated good faith by promptly complying with all subsequent appellate requirements. The Court emphasized that excusable procedural imperfections, which do not affect jurisdiction or prejudice the adverse party, should be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice. The appellate court’s dismissal for this non-jurisdictional technicality constituted a grave abuse of discretion.