G.R. No. L-42230 April 15, 1988
LAURO IMMACULATA, represented by his wife AMPARO VELASCO, as Guardian Ad Litem, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch No. II, and HEIRS OF JUANITO VICTORIA, et al., and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Lauro Immaculata, represented by his wife as guardian ad litem, originally obtained a parcel of land through a free patent. He subsequently sold this land to Juanito Victoria in December 1969. Petitioner later filed an action (Civil Case No. 20968) in March 1975 to annul the sale, alleging his insanity and intimidation at the time of the transaction. In the alternative, his complaint prayed that, should the court uphold the validity of the sale, he be allowed to legally redeem the property.
The Court’s decision dated November 26, 1986 resolved the main action. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, focusing on the previously unaddressed issue of his right of legal redemption under the Public Land Act, which he had pleaded in the alternative in his original complaint.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption over the land acquired by free patent, notwithstanding the prior resolution of the validity of the sale.

RULING

Yes, the petitioner is entitled to redeem the property. The Court granted the motion for reconsideration to resolve this specific issue. While the principle of res judicata now bars relitigation of the sale’s validity based on insanity or intimidation, the separate and distinct alternative cause of action for legal redemption remains unresolved and is hereby granted.
The legal basis for redemption is found in the Public Land Act. The Court noted that while the sale was executed in December 1969, a formal “deed of conveyance” was only executed on February 3, 1974, following court order. Petitioner’s offer to redeem, made on March 24, 1975, was well within the five-year period for legal redemption prescribed by law, counting from the execution of the formal deed.
The respondents’ argument that the offer was insincere due to lack of consignation is without merit. The Court clarified that the right to redeem is precisely that—a right, not an obligation. Consequently, a consignation is not a prerequisite to preserve or exercise the right to redeem. To actually effect the redemption, payment or consignation must, of course, be made. The case is remanded to the trial court to accept petitioner’s payment or consignation of the amount he originally received from the respondents to consummate the redemption. The November 26, 1986 decision is modified accordingly.