G.R. No. L-4221; August 30, 1952.
MARCELO D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner-appellant, vs. GEN. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, and COLONEL EULOGIO BALAO, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

On October 18, 1950, Maximino Montenegro was arrested by agents of the Military Intelligence Service for complicity with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection, or sedition. On October 22, 1950, President Elpidio Quirino issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. On October 21, 1950, Marcelo D. Montenegro, Maximino’s father, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking his son’s release. The respondents opposed the writ, invoking Proclamation No. 210. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City, heeding the suspension order, denied the release. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

The primary issue is the validity of Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Specific sub-issues include: (a) whether the proclamation is unconstitutional as a bill of attainder or ex post facto law, and for unlawfully including sedition; (b) whether there existed a state of invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof justifying the suspension; (c) whether the proclamation applies to Maximino Montenegro; and (d) the reconciliation of an apparent conflict between the Bill of Rights and Article VII, Section 10 of the Constitution regarding the grounds for suspension.

RULING

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 210 and affirmed the lower court’s decision denying the release.
(a) The Court ruled that the prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws applies only to statutes, not to presidential proclamations. Even assuming a conflict, the President’s power to suspend the writ, as expressly vested by the Constitution, constitutes an exception. The inclusion of “sedition” in the proclamation was erroneous, as the Constitution only permits suspension for “invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof.” However, this does not invalidate the entire proclamation; the word “sedition” is deemed surplusage, especially since the detainee was held for the graver offenses of rebellion and insurrection.
(b) The Court held that the President’s official declaration, based on recited facts indicating “actual danger of rebellion which may extend throughout the country,” amply justifies the suspension. The authority to decide when the exigency arises belongs to the President, and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts. Even if viewed as prima facie correct, the petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of correctness accorded to executive acts.
(c) The Court found that the respondents’ return, which alleged Maximino was detained for complicity in rebellion, insurrection, and sedition, was not traversed by the petitioner and must therefore be taken as true and conclusive, bringing the detainee within the terms of the proclamation.
(d) Addressing an issue raised by amici curiae, the Court reconciled an apparent conflict between the Bill of Rights (which lists only invasion, insurrection, or rebellion) and Article VII, Section 10 (which adds “imminent danger thereof”). Applying the rule that where two constitutional provisions are repugnant, the latter in order of time and position prevails, the Court upheld the President’s authority to suspend the writ in cases of imminent danger.
(e) The Court also ruled that the suspension order operates immediately on all habeas corpus petitions pending at the time of its promulgation, including this case filed before the proclamation.
The decision of the lower court was affirmed, without costs.