G.R. No. L-4143 May 28, 1951
SIXTO PAÑGILINAN, petitioner, vs. EMILIO PEÑA, Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA and CRISPULO Q. MANANSALA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Sixto Pañgilinan sought to stop the execution of a judgment for ejectment (desahucio) rendered against him by the Court of First Instance of Manila. The ejectment case was originally filed by respondent Crispulo Q. Manansala in the Manila municipal court to eject Pañgilinan from a lot in Sampaloc, Manila. After judgment for Manansala, Pañgilinan appealed to the Court of First Instance. Due to Pañgilinan’s failure to deposit the rents on time, the court ordered execution of the judgment despite his claim that the failure was due to illness. His motion for reconsideration was denied. Pañgilinan then invoked Commonwealth Act No. 538, which provides for the automatic suspension of ejectment actions against tenants when the Government seeks to acquire the estate through purchase or expropriation. He alleged that proceedings had been started by the City of Manila to expropriate the whole Nagtahan Estate, which included the lot from which he was to be ejected. The lower court again denied his plea, prompting this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction.
The undisputed facts further show that the lot (about 180 sq. m.) was originally part of the Nagtahan Estate of Rita Legarda Inc. Luis Gaddi obtained a lease with an option to purchase from the estate and transferred his rights to Manansala. Manansala exercised the option and purchased the lot from Rita Legarda Inc. via a Contract of Sale. Gaddi had built two houses on the lot, selling one to Manansala and the other to Pañgilinan. After purchasing the lot, Manansala demanded that Pañgilinan vacate and, upon refusal, initiated ejectment proceedings. Meanwhile, the City of Manila had initiated negotiations to purchase the Nagtahan Estate in 1947 for resale to occupants, which failed. In 1949, the Municipal Board passed Resolution No. 73 authorizing expropriation of the Nagtahan Estate, including the lot in question. This resolution was approved by the Cabinet and the President, and the City Mayor notified the owners of the intention to acquire the lands through expropriation.

ISSUE

1. Whether the respondent judge abused his discretion in ordering execution despite Pañgilinan’s claim of illness as reason for failing to deposit rent on time.
2. Whether the ejectment proceedings should be automatically suspended under Commonwealth Act No. 538 because the City of Manila had initiated expropriation proceedings for the Nagtahan Estate, which allegedly included the subject lot.

RULING

1. No abuse of discretion by the respondent judge. The Supreme Court held that execution is mandatory when rents are not deposited on time in ejectment cases on appeal, and the duty of the court to order such execution is ministerial and imperative. The respondent judge considered Manansala’s contention disputing the veracity of the illness and arguing that the deposit could have been made through others. Under the circumstances, the Court found no abuse of discretion.
2. The ejectment proceedings should not be suspended under Commonwealth Act No. 538. The Supreme Court ruled that even assuming Commonwealth Act No. 538 applies to expropriations by the City of Manila, the subject lot no longer formed part of the Nagtahan Estate at the time of the expropriation proceedings because it had already been sold to Manansala. Furthermore, the constitutional grant of the prerogative to expropriate lands for resale to occupants refers to landed estates and does not include small parcels of land. Since Manansala’s lot is a small parcel (180 sq. m.), it does not come under the purview of the Government’s right to expropriate lands for resale to occupants, and thus Commonwealth Act No. 538 does not apply. Therefore, Pañgilinan is not entitled to the automatic suspension of ejectment proceedings.
DISPOSITIVE:
The petition was denied and the preliminary injunction dissolved, with costs against petitioner. The Court, however, called attention to Section 13 of Rule 39, which prohibits the sheriff from destroying, demolishing, or removing improvements made by the defendant on the property except upon special order of the court after due hearing and the defendant’s failure to remove them within a reasonable time.