G.R. No. L-40491 May 28, 1975
Segundo Amante, petitioner, vs. Hon. Delfin Vir. Sunga, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch No. I, and Vigaan Agricultural Development Corporation, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Segundo Amante, defendant in Civil Case No. 7799, filed a motion on December 2, 1974, requesting a 15-day extension from December 9 to file his answer. The motion was addressed to the Clerk of Court, with a copy furnished to the opposing counsel. The trial court granted the extension on December 6, 1974. However, on December 10, 1974, Amante instead filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, properly notifying the adverse counsel. Subsequently, on December 11, 1974, the private respondent corporation filed a motion to set aside the December 6 Order, alleging defective notice under Rule 15, Section 5, and prayed that Amante be declared in default.
The motions were set for hearing on February 7, 1975. On that date, after being shown the corporation’s Articles of Incorporation, Amante agreed to withdraw his Motion for a Bill of Particulars. He also filed his Answer with Counterclaim on the same day. Nevertheless, on February 14, 1975, the respondent judge issued an Order setting aside the December 6 extension, declaring Amante in default, and authorizing the reception of the plaintiff’s evidence, solely on the ground of the alleged defective notice in the original motion for extension.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the petitioner in default based on a technical defect in the notice for an extension of time to file an answer.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and set aside the default order. The Court ruled that a motion for an extension of time to file a pleading is an ex parte motion. Notice to the adverse party is not strictly required as it is not a litigated motion where the other party has a right to resist; its granting is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The private respondent was not deprived of any substantial right by the alleged procedural defect. Furthermore, the filing of the Motion for a Bill of Particulars on December 10, 1974, had the effect of interrupting the period to file a responsive pleading under Rule 12, Section 1(b). Although this motion was later withdrawn, the Answer was filed on the same date as the withdrawal. The Court emphasized that default judgments, being expedient rather than merit-based, should be avoided when they cause positive injustice on technical grounds. The rules of procedure must be liberally construed to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. The precipitate declaration of default under these circumstances constituted a grave abuse of discretion.