G.R. No. L-3999 August 23, 1951
RAMON SANTOS, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. FRANCISCO GERONIMO, and ILDEFONSO TIERRA, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

FACTS

On August 1, 1946, Ramon Santos entered into a two-year lease contract with Maria Mutoc over a lot in Manila, with the right to construct a business building subject to its removal upon lease expiration. Santos built a house of strong materials. In October 1947, Mutoc sold the lot to Lourdes Tierra, who in January 1948 sold it to Ildefonso Tierra as guardian of certain minors. The deeds of sale contained no provision regarding the building. On February 17, 1948, Ildefonso Tierra filed an ejectment case against Santos in the Municipal Court of Manila, which was dismissed as the lease had not expired. To protect his investment, Santos filed an action on April 8, 1948, in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Mutoc, Lourdes Tierra, and Ildefonso Tierra, praying for indemnity of P12,000 for the house under Article 361 of the Civil Code, plus P3,000 damages. After the lease expired on August 1, 1948, Ildefonso Tierra filed another ejectment complaint against Santos on August 18, 1948. Santos moved to dismiss this second ejectment case, alleging the pendency of the civil case for damages in the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied. Santos then filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance, claiming the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction. The court granted the injunction but, after trial, dismissed the petition for lack of merit, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in not holding that the second ejectment case filed by Ildefonso Tierra against Ramon Santos in the municipal court should have been dismissed due to the pendency of the civil case for damages between the same parties and concerning the same subject matter in the Court of First Instance.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that there was no error. The test for determining if two actions are identical, such that judgment in one bars the other, requires identity of parties (or those representing the same interests), rights asserted, relief prayed for, facts founding the relief, and the essential basis of the relief sought. These elements were not present. In the ejectment case, the parties were Ildefonso Tierra and Ramon Santos; the subject matter was the lot and house; and the cause of action was recovery of possession plus unpaid rentals. In the damages case, the parties were Ramon Santos versus Maria Mutoc, Ildefonso Tierra, and Lourdes Tierra; the subject matter was the same lot and house; but the cause of action was damages suffered by the plaintiff. Thus, there was no identity of parties, cause of action, or relief, making them two distinct cases where judgment in one could not bar the other. Additionally, the appeal had become moot. During the appeal, the preliminary injunction was dissolved upon the respondent filing a bond, the ejectment case proceeded, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, it became final and executory, and a writ of execution was being enforced, rendering the certiorari case without useful purpose.