G.R. No. L-39800 June 27, 1975
ROMEO N. HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE C. COLAYCO as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI and ANTONIO M. NON, respondents.

FACTS

The parties submitted a compromise agreement, which the trial court approved and rendered as a decision on July 6, 1973. The agreement stipulated that petitioner Hernandez would sell a portion of his land to respondent Non, with specific measurements, including a right-of-way of 3 meters by 7 and 1/6 meters. The balance of the purchase price was to be paid within one year, secured by a real estate mortgage. Pursuant to the decision, Hernandez executed a Deed of Sale with Mortgage on August 11, 1973. A dispute arose when Non failed to pay the balance by the due date, July 5, 1974. Hernandez then sought to foreclose the mortgage. Non moved to hold Hernandez in contempt, alleging Hernandez had obstructed the right-of-way. Hernandez countered that the right-of-way strip was part of the land sold and included in the mortgage, and thus foreclosure was proper for non-payment. The trial court, in its order of September 12, 1974, denied Hernandez’s motion to dismiss the contempt proceedings and directed him to open the right-of-way, without resolving the core factual issue of whether the right-of-way strip was included in the sale.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders related to the contempt proceedings without first determining the pivotal factual issue of whether the land constituting the right-of-way was part of the property sold and mortgaged.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the challenged orders. The Court held that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion by failing to resolve the fundamental factual issue crucial to the contempt proceedings. The core dispute was whether the 3m x 7 1/6m strip for the right-of-way was intended to be part of the land sold to Non and thus included in the mortgage. If it was part of the sale, then Hernandez’s act of obstructing it after Non’s default could be a legitimate step in mortgage foreclosure, not contempt. If it was not part of the sale, then obstruction might constitute contempt for violating the court’s decision. The trial court’s order, which merely directed the opening of the right-of-way without making this essential factual determination, was issued arbitrarily. The Court emphasized that a judge must address the specific issues presented by the parties. Furthermore, the Court admonished the respondent judge for his unsatisfactory and curt compliance with a Supreme Court resolution, stating that such conduct showing a lack of proper respect and cooperativeness would not be tolerated. The case was remanded to the trial court to receive evidence and definitively resolve the stated factual issue.