G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982
MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Mapalad Aisporna was charged with violating Section 189 of the Insurance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without a certificate of authority. The information alleged that on or before June 21, 1969, in Cabanatuan City, she willfully solicited the insurance application of Eugenio S. Isidro on behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., resulting in the issuance of an accident policy, without having secured the required authority from the Insurance Commissioner.
The established facts show that Aisporna’s husband, Rodolfo, was the duly licensed agent for Perla Compania de Seguros. The policy in question was issued under his authority. The evidence indicated that Aisporna, as the wife of the licensed agent, assisted in the clerical work related to the policy, which was presented as a renewal initiated by a telephone call from the insured when her husband was absent. The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted her, finding her active participation constituted acting as an agent under the first paragraph of Section 189.

ISSUE

The central issue is whether a person can be convicted under the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act for acting as an insurance agent without a certificate of authority, without proof that she received compensation for such services.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and acquitted Aisporna. The legal logic hinges on the proper construction of Section 189. The Court ruled that the definition of an “agent” in the second paragraph of Section 189, which explicitly includes the element of receiving “commission or other compensation,” governs the term “agent” used in the first paragraph. Statutes must be construed as a whole, with each part given meaning in relation to the others.
Therefore, to be liable for acting as an agent without a license under Section 189, it is an essential element of the crime that the accused received compensation, either directly or indirectly, for services in obtaining new insurance. The Court cited American jurisprudence, including Jasper vs. State, which holds that an information failing to allege compensation charges no offense. In this case, the information filed against Aisporna did not allege she received any compensation. Furthermore, the factual findings confirmed she did not receive any. Since every element of the crime must be both alleged in the information and proved beyond reasonable doubt for a conviction, and the element of compensation was neither alleged nor proved, her conviction could not be sustained. The Court agreed with the Solicitor General’s position that no violation of the law occurred.