G.R. No. L-39373 September 30, 1974
FELIXBERTO W. FERRER, as administrator of the INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE SPOUSES ESTEBAN F. FERRER, SR. and MIGUELA WENCESLAO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. YANG SEPENG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellee Felixberto W. Ferrer, as administrator of an intestate estate, filed an action for recovery of a sum of money against defendant-appellant Yang Sepeng. During the trial on the merits set for November 8, 1967, only the defendant’s counsel appeared; the defendant himself was absent. Plaintiff presented his documentary evidence, which was admitted without objection. After the plaintiff rested his case, defendant’s counsel moved for postponement due to the defendant’s absence, but the trial court denied the motion, declared the case submitted for decision, and on the same day rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff P20,750.00 with interest, attorney’s fees, and costs.
Three weeks later, on December 2, 1967, the defendant filed a motion for new trial on the ground of “accident, mistake or excusable neglect.” He attached an affidavit stating that on the morning of the trial, he had “stomach trouble” and was consequently unable to attend. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the alleged ailment did not constitute excusable negligence, that the motion failed to allege any valid defense the defendant could prove, and that the defendant had effectively admitted the debt by not denying it under oath in his answer. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, prompting the defendant’s appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant-appellant’s motion for a new trial.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial and upheld the money judgment. The Court held that the defendant’s bare allegation of “stomach trouble,” without specific details on its nature and gravity, was patently inadequate to satisfactorily demonstrate “accident, mistake or excusable negligence” which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against, as required under the Rules of Court. More critically, the Court emphasized that a motion for new trial based on such grounds must, under Rule 37, Section 2, be accompanied by an affidavit of merits. This affidavit must show the facts constituting a valid defense that the movant could prove if a new trial were granted.
The defendant’s failure to submit any affidavit of merits was fatal to his cause. The legal logic is fundamental: a new trial would be a futile exercise and a waste of judicial resources if the movant cannot demonstrate a meritorious defense. Since the defendant did not comply with this indispensable requirement, the trial court committed no error in law in denying the motion. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the appellate court’s internal division on whether the stomach trouble presented a question of fact, as the absence of an affidavit of merits rendered the appeal devoid of merit as a pure question of law.