G.R. No. L-3937; April 27, 1951
Go Tecson, et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Higino Macadaeg, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners seek to quash an order of the Manila Court of First Instance appointing a receiver in Civil Case No. 5436, entitled “Go Chin Gun, et al. vs. Go Cho, et al.” In that case, plaintiffs (siblings of the deceased Paulino P. Gocheco) sued Paulino’s successors, asserting co-ownership rights over properties of their common ancestor Go Checo, specifically lots and buildings on Azcarraga and Aguilar Streets in Manila. They petitioned for receivership, alleging the properties were mortgaged, the indebtedness was negligently left unpaid despite sufficient rental income, foreclosure proceedings had been instituted, and there was danger of loss through a forced sale. The court initially appointed a receiver on May 27, 1940, but discontinued the receivership on July 23, 1949, upon a motion noting that Paulino’s estate was under settlement (Case No. R-569) and the properties were in custodia legis. After plaintiffs intervened in the intestate proceedings and their motion to remove the administrator was denied—the probate court holding the properties were no longer under the administrator—the plaintiffs renewed their petition for receivership in the civil case, and the court reinstated it. The background, per the complaint in Case No. 5436, alleges that after Go Checo’s death in 1914, Paulino, as administrator, fraudulently kept plaintiffs ignorant of the intestate proceedings, deprived them of their rightful shares by undervaluing properties awarded to himself, and commingled assets, creating a co-ownership. Plaintiffs demand partition and accounting.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction in appointing a receiver pendente lite.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding no abuse of discretion by the lower court. The power to appoint a receiver pendente lite is discretionary with the trial court, and appellate courts will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioners’ arguments were unavailing: (1) Plaintiffs’ cause of action subsists despite the lapse of time, as they allege active fraud and deception discovered only in April 1948; (2) The non-inclusion of other heirs is not fatal, as plaintiffs attribute trickery only to Paulino and the other heirs have means to protect their interests; (3) The allegations in the receivership petition were prima facie adequate, showing either diversion of funds or mal-administration, as properties renting for P4,500 monthly failed for years to liquidate mortgages totaling P50,000; and (4) The probate court’s declaration that the properties were not under its administrator’s management eliminated the danger of dual control. The trial court unquestionably had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver under Rule 61, Section 1, paragraphs (b) and (e).