GR L 39094; (April, 1975) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-39094. April 18, 1975.
Rufina Lim and Tiamseng, petitioners, vs. Hon. Pedro Samson C. Animas, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of South Cotabato; and Heirs of Tan Wahab, represented by Tan Batacan, respondents.
FACTS
The Heirs of Tan Wahab filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioners Rufina Lim and Tiamseng. After the case was set for pre-trial, notice was addressed to petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Marciano V. Guevarra, and served at his residence-office while he was in Manila. The notice was received by his married daughter, a visitor, who misplaced it and failed to inform him. Consequently, neither petitioners nor their counsel appeared at the pre-trial conference.
Respondent Judge issued an order declaring petitioners in default and authorizing the clerk of court to receive private respondents’ evidence ex parte. Petitioners’ subsequent motions to lift the default order were all denied. They thus filed this petition, arguing the default was invalid due to lack of proper notice.
ISSUE
Did the respondent judge commit grave abuse of discretion in declaring the petitioners in default for non-appearance at the pre-trial despite the notice of pre-trial being served only upon their counsel, and through an unauthorized person?
RULING
Yes, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted the petition, declaring the default order null and void. The legal logic is anchored on the mandatory nature of pre-trial and the due process requirements for its implementation. While Rule 20 mandates the appearance of both parties and their counsel at pre-trial, and authorizes default for non-appearance, such a severe sanction necessitates strict compliance with notice requirements to afford due process.
The Court held that before a party may be defaulted for failure to appear at pre-trial, it must be shown that both the party and counsel were duly served with notice. The notice must be served separately upon the party and the counsel of record, stating the purpose, time, and place. Service on the party may be made directly or through their counsel, who is then obligated to notify the client. In this case, notice was addressed only to counsel. Furthermore, service was effected on an unauthorized person—a visitor at the counsel’s home, not a member of his household or an employee—which did not constitute valid service. Therefore, the petitioners were not properly notified, rendering the order of default and the subsequent ex parte proceedings a denial of their right to be heard and a violation of procedural due process. The case was ordered to be set for proper pre-trial and trial on the merits.
