G.R. No. L-39087. April 27, 1984.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO DE JESUS y QUIZON, alias “ELIONG,” accused-appellant.

FACTS

The accused-appellant, Rogelio de Jesus, a 19-year-old farmer, was charged with the rape of Clara Mina, a 28-year-old unmarried woman. The incident occurred on January 3, 1974, in Barrio Amistad, Alicia, Isabela. Clara Mina was known to be feeble-minded, unable to perform basic personal tasks like combing her hair or bathing herself, and typically remained alone in her family’s house. On the afternoon in question, her mother, Pastora Simon, left her unattended. De Jesus, who lived nearby and was aware of Clara’s condition, entered the house. He carried Clara from a trunk, laid her on the floor, and despite her cries of protest (“Madi! Madi!”), proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. Pastora Simon returned unexpectedly, witnessed de Jesus naked on top of her daughter, and attempted to confront him, but he fled. Clara later recounted the assault to her mother. A medical examination revealed hymenal lacerations and fresh abrasions consistent with recent sexual intercourse. De Jesus was subsequently surrendered to the police. He executed an affidavit admitting to a sexual act but denied it was rape, claiming he only inserted a finger to “cure” her mental malady, a claim he later attributed to alleged maltreatment by jail guards.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the accused-appellant is guilty of rape under Article 335, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes carnal knowledge of a woman “deprived of reason,” considering the victim’s mental state and the defense’s challenge to her competency as a witness.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The legal logic proceeds from two key determinations: the competency of the victim as a witness and the nature of the crime committed. First, the Court held that Clara Mina, while feeble-minded, was a competent witness. Competency is determined by the ability to perceive, make known such perceptions to others, and understand the duty to tell the truth. The records showed she gave intelligible answers to the court, thereby satisfying this test. Her testimony was thus admissible and credible.
Second, the Court ruled that sexual intercourse with a feeble-minded woman constitutes rape under paragraph 2 of Article 335. The law’s requirement of being “deprived of reason” does not necessitate complete insanity; mental abnormality or deficiency is sufficient. Clara Mina’s profound mental incapacity, evidenced by her inability to perform elementary self-care, rendered her incapable of giving a free, intelligent, and voluntary consent to sexual acts. Consequently, even an apparent lack of physical resistance cannot be construed as legal consent. The medical findings corroborated her account of penetration, directly contradicting the appellant’s claim of merely inserting a finger. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was correctly appreciated by the trial court, resulting in the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appealed decision was affirmed in its entirety.