G.R. No. L-39083. March 16, 1988.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENJAMIN ANINON, accused-appellant.
FACTS
Benjamin Aninon and Policarpio Saycon were charged with murder for the killing of Cesar Agustin. The prosecution alleged that on September 12, 1963, in Negros Oriental, the accused, conspiring together, attacked and stabbed Agustin with a dagger and clubbed him with a piece of wood, causing his death. Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the prosecution presented testimonies from Dr. Antonio Trasmonte, who detailed the fatal wounds, and eyewitnesses Lauro Ibalig and Policarpio Saycon. The trial court subsequently discharged Saycon to be utilized as a state witness. Based on the evidence, the trial court convicted Aninon of murder, qualified by treachery, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Aninon appealed, assigning several errors. He contended that the trial court improperly discharged his co-accused Saycon after the prosecution had already presented its evidence. He also challenged the credibility of the conflicting testimonies of Ibalig and Saycon, argued that the evidence did not prove he inflicted the specific fatal wounds, and asserted that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE
The primary issues were: (1) whether the trial court erred in discharging accused Policarpio Saycon as a state witness; and (2) whether the prosecution proved the guilt of Benjamin Aninon for the crime of murder, particularly the qualifying circumstance of treachery, beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
The Supreme Court found no error in the discharge of Policarpio Saycon. Under the then-prevailing Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court, the discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness could be made at any time before the defense had presented its evidence. The record showed that the prosecution moved for Saycon’s discharge after presenting its evidence but before the defense began its case. Therefore, the discharge was procedurally sound, as it occurred at a stage when the court could still determine that Saycon did not appear to be the most guilty and that his testimony was absolutely necessary.
However, the Court modified the conviction from murder to homicide. The legal logic centered on the failure to prove the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia). For treachery to qualify a killing as murder, the means, method, or form of execution must be shown to have been deliberately adopted by the offender to ensure the act’s execution without risk from any defense the victim might make. The trial court’s finding of treachery was based merely on the suddenness of the attack. The Supreme Court reiterated established jurisprudence that suddenness alone does not constitute treachery; it must be proven that the assailant consciously intended to employ such method to avoid risk. The prosecution’s evidence only established that Aninon suddenly stabbed the victim from behind. There was no proof that this mode of attack was deliberately chosen to eliminate any chance of defense. Since the element of treachery was not proven with the same degree of certainty as the crime itself, the killing could only be classified as homicide. The penalty was accordingly reduced, and Aninon was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty for homicide.