G.R. No. L-39012 January 31, 1975
AVELINO ORDOÑO, petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL DAQUIGAN, presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I and CONRADO V. POSADAS, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of La Union and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Avelino Ordoño was charged with the rape of his daughter, Leonora, in 1970. The complaint was filed years later in 1973. During the preliminary investigation, the victim’s mother, Catalina Ordoño (the petitioner’s wife), executed a sworn statement explaining the delay. She stated that she and her daughter were initially threatened by Avelino, preventing them from reporting. She further revealed that Avelino had also raped their other daughter, Rosa, in 1973, for which he was already jailed. Catalina asserted that the rape of Leonora had been mentioned during the investigation and trial for the rape of Rosa.
The case was elevated to the Court of First Instance. During trial, the prosecution presented Catalina as a witness. The defense counsel objected, invoking the marital disqualification rule under Section 20(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which prohibits a spouse from testifying for or against the other without consent, except in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other. Counsel argued that Avelino had not consented to his wife’s testimony. The trial court overruled the objection, prompting Avelino to file the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE

Whether the rape of a daughter by her father constitutes a crime committed by the husband against his wife within the meaning of the exception to the marital disqualification rule, thereby making the wife a competent witness against her husband without his consent.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the trial court’s ruling. The legal logic centers on the interpretation of the exception “in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.” The Court rejected both a restrictive interpretation (limiting it to direct crimes like physical injury between spouses) and an overly broad one. Instead, it adopted the judicious criterion from Cargill vs. State: the exception applies when an offense “directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation.”
Applying this criterion, the Court held that a father’s rape of his daughter is a crime committed against the wife. The decision emphasized the nature of Filipino family relations, where a direct and vital bond exists between mother and daughter. Such an abominable and incestuous crime inherently undermines the marital foundation, causing profound injury to the wife-mother. The act constitutes a direct attack on the family unit and the wife’s personal and maternal interests, creating marital discord that falls squarely within the exception’s rationale. The Court cited supporting jurisprudence, including Wilkinson vs. People and State vs. Shultz, where wives were allowed to testify against husbands prosecuted for crimes against their daughters, as such crimes are an outrage upon the wife’s familial relations. Consequently, Catalina Ordoño was a competent witness, and the trial court correctly overruled the objection based on marital disqualification.