GR L 38989; (October, 1982) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-38989 October 29, 1982
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO CASTRO, accused-appellant.
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo Castro, was convicted of murder by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for causing the death of 9-year-old Ferdinand Recoco. The prosecution’s evidence, primarily from eyewitness Leonor Gata, established that on November 17, 1971, Castro, upon seeing his 4-year-old son being boxed by Ferdinand, ran towards the boy and struck him with successive fist blows and a “karate chop,” causing Ferdinand to fall. The boy later developed complications from his injuries and died on December 5, 1971, from septicemia secondary to trauma. Castro admitted to hitting Ferdinand but claimed he only delivered a single fist blow to stop the attack on his son, a version corroborated by defense witness Teofilo Casero.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery to convict the appellant of murder, and whether mitigating circumstances should be applied to reduce the crime to homicide and mitigate the penalty.
RULING
The Supreme Court modified the decision, finding the appellant guilty only of homicide. The legal logic centered on the absence of treachery. For treachery to qualify a killing as murder, the means of execution must be deliberately and consciously adopted to ensure the execution without risk to the assailant from the victim’s defense. The Court found that Castro acted on impulse upon seeing his young son being assaulted; he had no opportunity to plan or deliberately choose a method of attack. His actions were spontaneous, negating the deliberate calculation required for treachery.
Furthermore, the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and passion and obfuscation. The medical findings showed only an injury to the right eye, supporting the claim of a single blow and indicating a lack of intent to cause a fatal outcome. The cause of the obfuscation—the defense of his son—was legitimate, even if the provocation came from a child, as it arose from a natural paternal instinct. Consequently, the crime is homicide, mitigated by these two circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four years and two months of prision correccional as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum, with civil indemnities affirmed.