G.R. No. L-38974 March 25, 1975
OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and FREDERICK G. WEBBER, petitioners, vs. JUDGE AMADOR T. VALLEJOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, ALFREDO CATOLICO, and LEONARDO ALCID, in his capacity as City Sheriff of Manila, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Alfredo Catolico, then a Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, filed a complaint against Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation and its President, Frederick G. Webber. The first cause of action sought the return of ten stock certificates allegedly borrowed by the defendants for use as loan collateral. The second cause of action was for the collection of sums due under a “contract of personal and professional services,” wherein Catolico agreed to head Omico’s legal department and render services outside his office hours for a yearly salary and commission.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of improper venue and lack of cause of action. They argued Catolico was a resident of Quezon City, not Cavite, and that the second cause of action was based on a contract void for being contrary to law and public policy, as it involved a sitting judge engaging in private practice. Without resolving this motion, respondent Judge Vallejos declared petitioners in default for failure to file an answer within the reglementary period. A judgment by default was rendered, and a writ of execution was issued.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the petitioners in default and rendering judgment without first resolving their motion to dismiss which raised a jurisdictional challenge based on the illegality of the contract.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, set aside the default order and judgment, and ordered the respondent judge to hear and decide the motion to dismiss. The Court held that the motion to dismiss squarely presented a fundamental issue: the legality of the contract for professional services. A judge is expressly prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law. The contract, by its own terms requiring Catolico to render services as head of Omico’s legal department, constituted precisely such prohibited private practice. Contracts expressly prohibited by law, like this one, are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Consequently, the complaint based on this void contract stated no cause of action. The respondent judge had a duty to resolve this pivotal legal question before any further proceedings. By declaring the petitioners in default without first ruling on a motion that attacked the very foundation of the suit, the judge acted arbitrarily and in excess of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the remedy of appeal was deemed inadequate because a writ of execution had already been issued, making the judgment immediately enforceable and causing irreparable damage. Certiorari was therefore proper to correct this grave abuse of discretion. The temporary restraining order was made permanent.