GR L 38962; (September, 1986) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-38962 September 15, 1986
IN RE: MOTION TO CORRECT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-672 COVERING LOT NO. 4569 CAUAYAN CAD. FRANCISCA SOTO, petitioner-appellant, vs. MARINA S. JARENO, JOSEFINA S. MEDEL and LILIA S. ALILAIN, oppositors-appellees.
FACTS
Sergio Serfino, married to Francisca Soto in 1933, filed a homestead application in 1939 describing himself as married to her. However, when the Original Certificate of Title was issued in 1953, it named “Sergio Serfino, widower.” After Serfino’s death in 1965, Soto filed a motion with the Court of First Instance to correct the title by changing his civil status from “widower” to “married to Francisca Soto.” Her objective was to establish the land as conjugal property, entitling her to a share.
Two of Serfino’s daughters opposed the motion. They admitted their parents’ marriage but alleged that Soto had abandoned the family in 1942 to live with other men, bearing children from subsequent relationships. They contended their father described himself as a widower in 1953 due to Soto’s long absence. The trial court initially granted Soto’s motion but later reconsidered, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction due to Soto’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE
Did the trial court have jurisdiction to order the amendment of the certificate of title without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, and was the petition for amendment proper under Section 112 of Act 496?
RULING
Yes, the trial court had jurisdiction, but the petition was nonetheless improper and was correctly dismissed. The Supreme Court clarified that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional requirement but relates to a cause of action; its non-observance can be waived if not timely invoked. More importantly, the doctrine does not apply to private lands. The homestead, once registered under the Torrens system, ceased to be public land and was thus beyond the doctrine’s scope.
However, the Court dismissed the appeal because the remedy sought under Section 112 of Act 496 was not applicable. Citing Tangunan v. Republic, the Court held that a correction under this provision is permissible only when there is unanimity among parties or no adverse claim. Here, a clear controversy existed: Soto sought to alter the title to assert a conjugal share, while the oppositors, Serfino’s heirs, explicitly contested this claim. This dispute transformed the matter into a contentious issue over ownership that could not be resolved via a mere petition for correction. The proper recourse for Soto was to institute or intervene in the intestate proceedings of Sergio Serfino and there file an ordinary action to assert her alleged rights over the property.
