GR L 126; (December, 1901) (Digest)
March 7, 2026GR L 541; (December, 1901) (Digest)
March 7, 2026G.R. No. L-389, November 5, 1901
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. FLORENTINA JARRILLA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
On the morning of August 21, 1897, Florentina Jarrilla, motivated by jealousy and resentment against Natalia Diño due to the latter’s amorous relations with Jarrilla’s husband, went to Diño’s house while Diño was away. Using a bolo, Jarrilla destroyed one of the house’s partitions. She then dragged the partition a distance away from the house and set it on fire. Due to the direction of the wind, the fire spread to and completely burned Diño’s house and its contents, valued at 9 pesos, 4 reales, and 4 cuartos. The entire house was worth no more than 3 pesos, and the destroyed partition could not have exceeded 125 pesetas in value. The facts were established through witness testimony, expert testimony, ocular inspection, and the confession of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts committed by Florentina Jarrilla constitute the felony of arson with malice, or merely the misdemeanor of malicious mischief and the crime of arson by reckless negligence.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Jarrilla’s acts constituted the misdemeanor of malicious mischief and the crime of arson by reckless negligence, not the felony of malicious arson. The destruction of the partition, valued at less than 125 pesetas, was a misdemeanor of malicious mischief falling under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. The burning of the house was classified as arson by reckless negligence because, while Jarrilla intentionally set fire to the separated partition, there was no conclusive proof of a malicious intent to burn the house itself; the house caught fire due to the wind. The mitigating circumstance of having acted under the passion of jealousy (Article 9, No. 7 of the Penal Code) was considered.
The Court reversed the lower court’s judgment. Jarrilla was sentenced to one month and one day of arresto mayor, with the corresponding accessories under Article 61, indemnification for damages (or subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency), and payment of costs. One-half of her provisional imprisonment was to be credited.
