GR L 38871; (July, 1974) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-38871 July 31, 1974
JUANITO MADARANG, petitioner, vs. HON. REYNALDO B. HONRADO in his capacity as judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XXV, JOSEPHINE MADARANG and CARLOS MADARANG, represented by their mother and guardian ad litem ESPERANZA MODEQUILLO MADARANG, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Juanito Madarang is the defendant in an action for support filed by his wife, Esperanza Modequillo Madarang, on behalf of their two minor children, Josephine and Carlos. In his answer, Madarang denied paternity of the children, alleging they were born more than a year after he and his wife had separated and were fathered by other men. The trial court, presided by respondent Judge Reynaldo B. Honrado, issued an order dated May 25, 1973, provisionally granting support pendente lite. This order was subsequently annulled and set aside by a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals.
Despite the annulment, respondent judge issued a new order on June 18, 1974, directing the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the payment of support amounts based on the previously annulled order. This prompted Madarang to file the instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, arguing that the June 18 order was issued with grave abuse of discretion since it sought to execute an order that had already been voided by a higher court.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of June 18, 1974, which directed the execution of a support pendente lite order that had been annulled by the Court of Appeals.
RULING
Yes, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court, however, dismissed the petition as it had become moot and academic due to a supervening event. During the proceedings, counsel for the private respondents, Atty. Prospero Crescini, manifested that his clients were abandoning the writ of execution issued under the June 18 order. He further informed the Court that a new motion exclusively for support pendente lite, excluding any claim for arrears from the annulled order, had been filed in the lower court. This action effectively removed the controversy, as the new motion would allow the trial court to issue a fresh order free from the procedural flaw of attempting to execute a voided prior order.
The legal logic is clear: an order that has been annulled and set aside by a final decision of a higher court loses all legal force and effect. To issue execution based on such a void order constitutes an act in excess of jurisdiction, as the trial court no longer had any valid basis to enforce it. The proper course, which the private respondents subsequently adopted, was to file a new application for provisional support, allowing the court to make a fresh determination based on the evidence and the applicable provisional standards, without taint from the prior invalidated proceeding. The Court commended Atty. Crescini for his cooperative and correct procedural approach, which served the broader interests of justice.
