GR L 3860; (February, 1908) (Digest)
March 4, 2026GR L 3937; (February, 1908) (Digest)
March 4, 2026FACTS:
This case originated as an action to recover cocoa lands in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. The plaintiffs, Lazaro Remo, et al., appealed the judgment of the trial court. However, the record of the case submitted to the Supreme Court was in an “imperfect condition,” lacking stenographic notes and containing only barely legible pencil minutes of the judge, making it impossible for the appellate court to review the proofs presented during trial. Furthermore, the appellants did not move for a new trial upon proper statutory grounds. Their motion for a new trial was filed under subdivision 2 of section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which rendered its denial by the trial judge discretionary and not subject to exception. The grounds for this motion were also vaguely stated, failing to define their nature or object. The trial judge, in his judgment, detailed the evidence that justified his conclusion and properly refused to grant a new trial for the plaintiffs to procure rebutting proof.
ISSUE:
Can the Supreme Court review the facts and evidence presented in the trial court when the record is incomplete, and the appellant failed to move for a new trial on proper statutory grounds?
RULING:
The Supreme Court, in its decision on February 14, 1908, in G.R. No. L-3870, AFFIRMED the judgment of the trial court.
The Court ruled that it could not review the facts for several reasons:
1. The record from the trial court was in an “imperfect condition” (lacking stenographic notes and having barely legible minutes), making it impossible to review the proofs.
2. The appellants failed to move for a new trial on proper statutory grounds.
3. The appellant’s motion for a new trial was made under subdivision 2 of section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, meaning its denial was discretionary to the trial judge and therefore not subject to exception or review by the appellate court.
4. The grounds for the motion for a new trial were vaguely stated.
Given these procedural deficiencies preventing a review of the facts, the judgment of the trial court had to be affirmed, as it was sustained by the facts recited therein and those admitted in the pleadings. The Supreme Court noted that the trial judge’s own judgment detailed the evidence that justified his conclusion, and his refusal to grant a new trial for further proof was proper.
