GR L 38440; (July, 1982) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-38440 July 20, 1982
ATTY. DOMINGO V. FLORES, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HON. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 13, and Military Trial Counsel Capt. SOTERO SORIANO and Prosecuting Fiscal LILIA LOPEZ, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Domingo V. Flores, Jr., along with others, was charged before Military Commission No. 13 with estafa through falsification of commercial documents. After arraignment and the conclusion of the prosecution’s presentation of evidence, the Secretary of National Defense, upon a petition from an accused, issued a memorandum directing the withdrawal of the charges from the military commission pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 39. The commission, acknowledging the directive, effectively terminated the hearing.
Subsequently, the Secretary of National Defense, after further consideration, withdrew his previous order and directed the military commission to proceed with the trial. The commission scheduled the continuation of the trial. Petitioner moved to quash the case, pleading double jeopardy, arguing that the initial withdrawal order operated as an acquittal and that reinstating the case placed him twice in jeopardy. The military commission denied his motion.
ISSUE
Whether the reinstatement of the criminal case against the petitioner after its initial withdrawal by the Secretary of National Defense constitutes a violation of the constitutional right against double jeopardy.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that no double jeopardy attached. The Court explained that under the military justice system established by Presidential Decree No. 39, a military commission functions analogously to an examining or preliminary court. Its proceedings are not final until reviewed and confirmed by the convening authority (the Secretary of National Defense) and ultimately by the President. The initial order of withdrawal, while terminating the hearing before the commission, lacked the attributes of a final judgment because it had not undergone the complete review process required for a final adjudication.
The legal logic is that jeopardy, while having attached upon the commencement of trial, had not yet terminated. Termination of jeopardy in this context occurs only upon the finality of the judgment after the complete hierarchical review. The Secretary’s act of withdrawing his initial directive and ordering the continuation of the trial was deemed a mere continuation of the same, singular proceeding, not the initiation of a second or new trial. Therefore, since there was no final termination of the first jeopardy, the constitutional protection against being twice put in jeopardy was not violated. The proceedings before the military commission remained one continuous process subject to the control and review of the convening authority.