G.R. No. L-38229 August 30, 1974
BASILIO S. PALANG, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE MARIANO A. ZOSA, judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V, and JULIETO P. HERRERA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Basilio S. Palang filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the disqualification of respondent Judge Mariano A. Zosa from presiding over a civil case for damages filed against him by private respondent Julieto P. Herrera. The civil case stemmed from a prior criminal case for estafa where Herrera was the accused and Palang was the complainant. In that criminal case, Judge Zosa acquitted Herrera, and in his decision, used strong language, characterizing Palang’s charge as a “clear concocted story” and describing the testimonies as “rehearsed and rehashed,” maliciously presented, causing damage to Herrera’s reputation.
Palang, now the defendant in the subsequent civil suit, argued that given the judge’s previous findings and the forceful language used in the acquittal, there was a well-grounded fear that Judge Zosa could no longer act with the requisite impartiality in deciding the civil case. He invoked the constitutional guarantee of due process, which requires a hearing before an impartial tribunal, as established in Gutierrez v. Santos.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Mariano A. Zosa should be disqualified from trying the civil case for damages on the ground of perceived bias and partiality, thereby violating the due process right to a hearing before an impartial judge.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as moot and academic, commending the voluntary inhibition of respondent Judge. While the case was pending decision after the parties had submitted their memoranda, private respondent Herrera filed a motion to withdraw his opposition to the petition, expressing a desire for an early disposition of the civil case by another judge. Subsequently, respondent Judge Zosa filed a manifestation, stating that in light of the withdrawal, he found no reason not to inhibit himself and voluntarily recused from trying the civil case.
The Court held that this voluntary inhibition was proper and in full accord with the exacting standards of judicial conduct. The legal logic rests on the principle that due process demands not only actual impartiality but also the appearance of impartiality to preserve public confidence in the judiciary. A judge must avoid any situation that could erode trust in the fairness of proceedings. The Court emphasized that it is insufficient for a judge to be pure in fact; like Caesar’s wife, a judge must be beyond suspicion. The respondent Judge’s action reinforced public faith in the administration of justice and demonstrated deference to the due process mandate. By removing himself, he ensured that the cold neutrality required of the bench was maintained, both in reality and in perception, thereby rendering the petition unnecessary.