G.R. No. L-38196 July 22, 1975
FEDERICO PINEDA, MAGDALENA G. PINEDA, and FERNANDO MAGLASANG, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICENTE P. BULLECER, in his capacity as Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental, MARGARITA P. VDA. DE ARREZA, and the Minors RODOLFO, PANTALEON, JR., MERUNDA, NESTOR, RODRIGO and RUBEN, all surnamed ARREZA, represented by their mother and guardian ad-litem MARGARITA P. VDA. DE ARREZA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners were defendants in a damages case (Civil Case No. 180). They were declared in default for failure to appear at pre-trial, and a decision was rendered against them on November 6, 1970. They received this decision on October 28, 1971. On November 24, 1971, they filed a motion for new trial, which was granted by the trial court on March 16, 1972. Private respondents challenged this grant of new trial via certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP-01641-R). The Court of Appeals, in a decision dated August 13, 1973, set aside the trial court’s order granting a new trial. Petitioners received this appellate decision on September 17, 1973.
Believing they had time to appeal the original 1970 trial court decision, petitioners filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal on October 1, 1973. The trial judge, however, disallowed the appeal on October 4, 1973, ruling it was filed out of time. The judge computed that the filing of the motion for new trial on November 24, 1971, interrupted the 30-day appeal period, leaving only 3 days remaining. This 3-day period allegedly resumed running upon petitioners’ receipt of the Court of Appeals’ decision on September 17, 1973, expiring on September 20, 1973. The Court of Appeals upheld this computation, dismissing petitioners’ subsequent mandamus action.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly computed the remaining period for petitioners to perfect their appeal from the original 1970 decision.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts. The legal logic hinges on the effect of an appellate court’s reversal of an order granting a new trial. The Court clarified that when a motion for new trial is granted, the original judgment is effectively vacated. If a higher court later reverses the order granting a new trial, that reversal does not automatically revive the original judgment for purposes of computing the appeal period from its original receipt.
Instead, the period to appeal the original judgment must be reckoned from the finality of the appellate court’s decision that set aside the new trial order. The original judgment only becomes final and appealable again upon the entry of final judgment in the certiorari case that nullified the new trial. In this case, the petitioners perfected their appeal on October 1, 1973, which was even before the Court of Appeals’ decision in CA-G.R. No. SP-01641-R (dated August 13, 1973) had become final. Therefore, their appeal was timely filed. The Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision and ordered the trial court to give due course to petitioners’ appeal.