GR L 38161; (March, 1974) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-38161. March 29, 1974.
Juan Bello and Filomena C. Bello, petitioners, vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon. Francisco Llamas, as Judge of Pasay City Court, and Republic of the Philippines, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners were convicted of estafa by the Pasay City Court, a case falling within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the city court and the Court of First Instance (CFI). They filed a notice of appeal to the CFI of Pasay City. The prosecution moved to dismiss the appeal, correctly arguing that since the trial was duly recorded, the appeal under the Judiciary Act should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners opposed, praying that if the CFI found the appeal erroneously filed, it should certify the case to the proper appellate court instead of dismissing it. The CFI, however, per its order of October 29, 1971, dismissed the appeal and ordered the remand of the case to the city court for execution of judgment. Petitioners claim they received no notice of this dismissal.
Upon learning of the dismissal when summoned for execution, petitioners filed a motion with the city court to elevate the appeal to the Court of Appeals. The city court denied the motion, stating it was erroneously addressed to it instead of the CFI. Petitioners then filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals against the Republic and the city court judge, seeking to prohibit execution and compel the elevation of their appeal. The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, expressed no objection to setting aside the CFI’s dismissal order.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus due to the non-inclusion of the CFI judge as a formal party respondent.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court set aside the appellate court’s decision, holding that it sacrificed substance to form. The core legal principle is that when an appeal is erroneously taken to a court, that court should not dismiss it but should certify it to the proper court. This is mandated by Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court for cases erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, and the same logic and equity must apply by analogy to a CFI erroneously taking an appeal from an inferior court. The CFI of Pasay City, upon finding the appeal was wrongly brought before it, should have certified the appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the procedural ground that the CFI judge was not impleaded as a principal party respondent as required by Rule 65. The Supreme Court found this overly technical. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, was the real party in interest as the prosecuting entity. The Solicitor General had manifested no objection to the relief sought by petitioners. The CFI, in dismissing the appeal, acted on behalf of the State. Therefore, the State, through its counsel, was effectively represented, and the failure to name the CFI judge was a mere formal defect. The paramount concern is to afford a review of the conviction on the merits, preventing a miscarriage of justice due to a procedural error by counsel. The case was remanded to the CFI with instructions to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals.
