G.R. No. L-38024. February 28, 1974.
FERNANDO PIEDAD, petitioner, vs. AGUSTINA BATUYONG and COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS NORTE, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Agustina Batuyong filed a complaint for recovery of an unregistered parcel of land against petitioner Fernando Piedad. After pre-trial, the initial hearing was scheduled for August 23, 1973. On that date, petitioner appeared in court with his witnesses but filed a manifestation, prepared and signed by his counsel, Atty. Aproniano Nicolas, requesting a postponement. The motion stated that Atty. Nicolas had decided to withdraw from the case, and petitioner needed an opportunity to engage new counsel.
The respondent court summarily denied the postponement, proceeded with the trial ex-parte, received Batuyong’s evidence, and rendered a decision against Piedad on the same day. Petitioner immediately filed a verified motion to lift the order of default and to be allowed his day in court, attaching documentary evidence supporting his claim of ownership and possession since 1950. This motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration filed through new counsel were both denied by the trial court, which held that the misunderstanding between petitioner and his former counsel was not its concern.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for continuance of the initial hearing and in rendering an ex-parte judgment, thereby depriving him of his right to a day in court.

RULING

Yes, the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that while the grant or denial of a motion for postponement rests on the sound discretion of the trial court, such discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently to serve the ends of justice and fairness. Petitioner was present and ready with his witnesses at the initial hearing. His request for continuance was necessitated by his counsel’s last-hour withdrawal, a circumstance for which petitioner himself was not at fault, malicious, or negligent.
Under these conditions, the trial court’s outright denial of a reasonable opportunity for petitioner to secure new counsel and present his evidence was a capricious exercise of discretion that effectively denied him his fundamental right to due process. The Court emphasized that when a litigant, without blame, is deprived of counsel at the trial, a continuance should be granted to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The subsequent motions, which showed petitioner’s valid defenses through an affidavit of merit and documentary evidence, made the denial even more unjust.
Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the challenged decision and orders and remanded the case to the trial court to allow petitioner to cross-examine the respondent and present his evidence for a judgment on the merits.