G.R. No. L-37933. April 15, 1988.
FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B. MERCADO, petitioners, vs. HON. RAMON E. NAZARENO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu and TEODORO DE LA VEGA, JR., respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr., along with others, was charged with murder. All accused, including de la Vega, were arraigned on August 22, 1973, where they pleaded not guilty. The trial court scheduled the initial hearing for September 18, 1973, and all accused were duly notified. However, before this date, de la Vega escaped from detention and failed to appear at the hearing. The petitioners, the fiscals handling the case, moved for trial to proceed against all accused, invoking the constitutional provision on trial in absentia under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. The trial court proceeded with the trial but reserved de la Vega’s right to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence should he later reappear.
After trial, the court dismissed the case against the other accused but held the proceedings against de la Vega in abeyance. The court’s order stated that proceedings would remain pending, without prejudice to de la Vega’s right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and present his defense once the court reacquired jurisdiction over his person. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing this ruling negated the constitutional provision on trial in absentia, but it was denied.

ISSUE

1. Whether a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who, after arraignment, escapes from custody.
2. Whether an accused tried in absentia retains the right to present evidence and to confront and cross-examine witnesses.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. On the first issue, the Court held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused, acquired through his appearance at arraignment, is not lost by his subsequent escape. Jurisdiction, once validly acquired, continues until the final termination of the case. The act of escaping does not divest the court of its authority.
On the second issue, the Court held that an accused who, after arraignment and due notice, unjustifiably fails to appear for trial, may be tried in absentia. All requisites for a valid trial in absentia were present here: de la Vega was arraigned, notified of the trial, and his absence was unjustified due to his escape. By voluntarily absenting himself, he is deemed to have waived his personal rights to be present, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence on his behalf. These rights are personal and can be waived. The trial court therefore erred in suspending proceedings and reserving these rights for de la Vega. The constitutional presumption of innocence and the right to due process are not violated, as the accused was given the opportunity to be heard but chose to waive it by escaping. The Court directed the respondent judge to render judgment based on the evidence already adduced.