G.R. No. L-3761; April 20, 1951
Manolita Gonzales de Carungcong, as Special Administrator of the Estate of the late Manuela I. Vda. de Gonzales, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Juan Cojuangco, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

On November 30, 1945, Manuela I. Vda. de Gonzales filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the reconstitution of the judicial record of a civil case she had instituted against Juan Cojuangco in 1944. The petition alleged that the case was to compel acceptance of a tender of payment to discharge a mortgage held by Cojuangco on a piece of land; the tender was refused, and the amount was deposited in court via a PNB cashier’s check. After an answer was filed and the case heard, the court allegedly rendered judgment around November 1944, declaring the tender valid and the mortgage paid and cancelled. The record was subsequently destroyed during the liberation of Manila. The court set the case for reconstitution and required the parties to present all copies of motions, decrees, orders, and other documents. Plaintiff could not present any such copies despite extensions. On August 14, 1946, plaintiff filed a “Statement of the Case Reconstituted,” setting forth her version of the pleadings, proceedings, and decision, and asked that the record be declared reconstituted. Defendant opposed this. The court, in its order of November 6, 1946, denied the request, noting the plaintiff failed to present certified copies of the original documents, especially the alleged decision. The court cited Section 7 of Act No. 3110 , which requires an authentic copy to reconstitute a decision, and ordered that reconstitution did not proceed and the case should be tried anew, upon reproduction or presentation of pleadings. No appeal was taken from this order. More than three years later, after Manuela I. Vda. de Gonzales had died, her administratrix filed in the reconstitution proceeding a motion to admit a “complaint,” which was essentially a rehash of the previously rejected “Statement of the Case Reconstituted,” praying for judgment declaring the tender valid and the mortgage discharged. Defendant opposed this motion. The lower court denied the motion to admit the so-called “complaint,” and plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in denying the motion to admit the “complaint” filed by the appellant in the reconstitution proceeding, which was essentially a synopsis of the destroyed case not agreed upon by the opposing party, instead of requiring the filing of an entirely new action.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower court. The Court held that the attempt at reconstitution failed because the parties neither presented copies of the documents constituting the original record nor filed a written agreement on the facts as substitutes, as required by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 3110 . The applicable provision is Section 30 of the same Act, which states that when reconstitution is not possible, the interested parties may file their actions anew upon payment of proper fees, and such actions shall be registered and treated as new. The lower court’s order of November 6, 1946, which decreed that reconstitution was improper and the case should be tried anew, was in line with this provision. Appellant’s position—that she could comply by presenting a unilateral synopsis of the case—contradicted the law and would absurdly allow reconstitution after it had been declared impossible. The appellant’s plain recourse was to file her action anew and pay the proper fee. The order appealed from was affirmed, with costs against the appellant.