GR L 362; (August, 1946) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-362; August 31, 1946
AMANDO CALUAG DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA and FELISA ROMAN VDA. DE MORENO, respondents.
FACTS
In an ejectment case filed in the justice of the peace court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, respondent Felisa Roman Vda. de Moreno (plaintiff) obtained a decision on November 27, 1941, against petitioner Amando Caluag Domingo (defendant), ordering him to vacate the land and pay P30 (unpaid rent from September 1940 to September 1941) plus P65 annually thereafter until restitution, and costs. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). During the appeal’s pendency, respondent moved for execution of the justice of the peace court’s decision. The CFI initially granted execution on September 9, 1943, but later lifted it upon petitioner posting a P1,000 bond (in Japanese military notes) as per its order of August 2, 1944. By agreement of the parties, this bond was substituted with a cash bond of P1,000 in Philippine currency, approved by the CFI in its order of August 8, 1945, which provided that execution would automatically follow if the bond was not filed within twelve days. On December 20, 1945, despite the existence of this cash bond, the CFI granted another motion by respondent and ordered execution under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner seeks to annul this December 20, 1945, order via certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of execution dated December 20, 1945, despite the prior agreement and court approval for suspending execution upon the filing of a P1,000 cash bond.
RULING
The petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The order of execution dated December 20, 1945, is SET ASIDE.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Felisa Roman, by her own act, had waived her right to immediate execution under Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. The rule ordinarily entitles a winning plaintiff in an ejectment case to immediate execution upon appeal unless the defendant files a supersedeas bond and pays the accruing rents during the appeal’s pendency. However, in this case, respondent agreed on two occasions (in 1944 and 1945) to suspend execution merely upon petitioner’s filing of a P1,000 cash bond, despite petitioner having failed to pay rents falling due after the 1941 decision. This agreement was expressly approved by the CFI in its August 8, 1945, order. The warning in that order—that execution would automatically follow if the bond was not filed—clearly indicated that the bond’s filing was the sole condition for suspending execution. Furthermore, the P1,000 bond amount was excessive if intended only to secure unpaid rents (which totaled only P290 by 1945), indicating it was meant to cover future rents as well. The respondent’s attorney admitted the deposit constituted the supersedeas bond. Therefore, the CFI’s subsequent order for execution, based on the reasoning that the cash deposit was not a supersedeas bond and was made before the CFI’s judgment, constituted a grave abuse of discretion. The cash bond, filed before the CFI’s judgment (rendered October 31, 1945), continued to serve its purpose thereafter, as implied under Section 9, Rule 72. The Court found it unnecessary to rule on the alleged lack of notice for the execution motion.