G.R. No. L-36021. February 29, 1988.
ROSALIA M. DEL CARMEN, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ULDARICO MEDINA AND BEDA J. GONZALES, respondents.

FACTS

This case originated from the intestate estate proceeding of Agustin N. Medina. The probate court issued an order on January 29, 1969, approving the sale of the estate property “Bitucang Manok” to petitioner Rosalia Medina del Carmen, an heir. Private respondents Uldarico Medina and Beda J. Gonzales received a copy of this order on February 6, 1969. They initially filed an Urgent Manifestation on February 15, 1969, seeking suspension of the order’s implementation and an opportunity to check accounting records. It was only on March 27, 1969, that they filed a motion specifically praying to set aside the sale order.
Subsequently, the probate court issued an order on March 6, 1970, confirming the sale to petitioner, finding the respondents’ objections without merit. The court noted that Uldarico Medina had received advances from the estate, indicating financial straits, and that Beda Gonzales, as an assignee of some heirs, could not claim a better right than the petitioner-vendee who had deposited the full purchase price. Respondents received this confirmation order on April 8, 1970, filed a motion for reconsideration on April 17, which was denied, and then filed a second motion for reconsideration (captioned “Petition For Reception of Evidence”) on June 23, 1970. This second motion was denied on August 3, 1970. Respondents filed their Notice of Appeal on August 13, 1970.

ISSUE

Whether the private respondents’ appeal to the Court of Appeals was filed on time.

RULING

No, the appeal was filed out of time, rendering the probate court’s orders final and executory. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner’s contention. The pivotal point was the effect of the second motion for reconsideration filed on June 23, 1970. The Court ruled this motion was pro-forma. It raised no new substantial ground, as its additional argument—that respondents had filed a bond—lacked merit and had already been implicitly passed upon by the probate court in its March 6, 1970, order, which found the offer of a bond to be an insufficient ground to oppose the sale.
A pro-forma motion does not toll the running of the appeal period. Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Since the second motion did not interrupt the period, the 30-day period to appeal from the receipt of the order denying the first motion for reconsideration (June 18, 1970) continued to run. The last day to appeal was on or before August 9, 1970. The Notice of Appeal filed on August 13, 1970, was therefore late. The Court found the respondents’ actions to be dilatory tactics, especially since the petitioner had fully paid for the property in 1969. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the appellate court’s resolutions, and dismissed the respondents’ appeal.