G.R. No. L-35855. April 28, 1983.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HILARIO BAUTISTA y VILLANUEVA, et al., accused. SIMEON BAUTISTA and LEVY CRUZ, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

Accused Simeon Bautista and Levy Cruz, along with several others, were charged with murder for the death of Felicisimo Dionida. The prosecution’s case rested primarily on the testimony of eyewitness Proceso Cebrian. He testified that in the early morning of December 2, 1966, he, the victim, and others were confronted by a group of nine men, including the appellants, at the Manila Polo Club. The victim was ordered into a car occupied by appellants and others, while Cebrian was made to board a separate jeep. Both vehicles proceeded to the Manila International Airport. Cebrian, from a distance of about 130 meters, heard three gunshots from the direction of the car. The occupants of the car, including appellants, returned without the victim. Dionida’s body was later found at the airport dumping area with fatal gunshot wounds.
Appellants interposed the defense of alibi. Levy Cruz claimed he was in Olongapo City on a police mission, while Simeon Bautista asserted he was in Nueva Ecija for his wedding anniversary. After trial, the Court of First Instance convicted appellants Simeon Bautista and Levy Cruz of murder, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The court acquitted several other accused for lack of proof. Appellants appealed their conviction.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the prosecution evidence, chiefly the testimony of Proceso Cebrian, proved beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of appellants Simeon Bautista and Levy Cruz, either as principals by direct participation or through conspiracy.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and acquitted appellants on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Court, adopting the position of the Solicitor General who joined the appellants in seeking reversal, held that the evidence failed to establish conspiracy or direct participation. While Cebrian’s testimony placed appellants at the scene and inside the car with the victim, it was utterly silent on any specific act performed by either appellant that constituted participation in the killing. The testimony did not show what appellants did when the victim was taken, during the ride, or at the dumping area when the shots were fired. Mere presence at the crime scene, without any showing of overt acts indicative of a common criminal design or direct cooperation in the execution of the crime, is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Conspiracy must be proven as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. The evidence did not provide moral certainty that appellants conspired with or directly participated in the killing. Consequently, the guilt of appellants was not established beyond a reasonable doubt. They were ordered released unless detained for another lawful cause.