G.R. No. L-35851 October 8, 1974
MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION and BENITO MACROHON, in his capacity as Sheriff of Quezon City, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PETRA R. FARIN and BENJAMIN FARIN, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Marcelo Steel Corporation and Sheriff Benito Macrohon sought the dismissal of the appeal filed by respondents Petra and Benjamin Farin in the Court of Appeals. The ground for dismissal was that the respondents’ Record on Appeal failed to contain any statement indicating the timely filing of an appeal bond, a requirement under Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners argued this omission constituted a fatal jurisdictional defect, citing consistent jurisprudence.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss. It noted that while the Record on Appeal itself lacked the statement, the fact of the timely filing of the cash appeal bond was established through other means. Specifically, in a prior related certiorari proceeding (CA-G.R. No. 47519-R) between the same parties, the petitioners had judicially admitted in their answer that the respondents filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal on October 30, 1970. The Court of Appeals had also made a clear pronouncement in its decision in that prior case that all requisites for a valid appeal were complied with.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the appeal despite the Record on Appeal’s failure to state the filing of the appeal bond.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the Court of Appeals’ resolution. The Court explained that the primary purpose of the rule requiring the Record on Appeal to show data proving timely perfection of the appeal is to enable the appellate court to determine timeliness from the face of the record itself, thereby avoiding protracted disputes and evidence presentation on that preliminary matter.
However, the Court ruled this rule does not apply in situations where the timeliness of the appeal is already a matter of judicial notice to the court or is established by judicial admissions in a related proceeding. In this case, the Court of Appeals could properly rely on its own judicial knowledge from the prior certiorari case, where the petitioners had admitted the very fact in question—the simultaneous filing of the notice of appeal and the appeal bond. To require the parties to relitigate this already settled and admitted fact would be absurd, contrary to justice, and could lead to contradictory findings. The principle of estoppel operates against the petitioners, who cannot now dispute a fact they previously admitted.
The Supreme Court clarified that this decision does not relax the standing jurisprudence on the mandatory nature of Rule 41, Section 6. It merely recognizes an exception where the purpose of the rule—to avoid disputes over timeliness—is not served because no such dispute can genuinely exist due to judicial admissions and the court’s judicial notice. The ruling is confined to the peculiar circumstances of this case and has no bearing on other pending cases between the parties.