G.R. No. L-35673 December 14, 1979
ANTONIO S. COHON, petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO D. CINCO, as Judge Presiding Branch No. VIII, Court of First Instance of Cebu; The Provincial Fiscal of Cebu, SANTIAGO N. MEDIDA, The Fifth Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu, MANUEL R. POTOT, and SAN VICENTE SHIPPING LINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Antonio S. Cohon, owner of Lapu-lapu Shipping Lines, was charged criminally for allegedly operating a vessel and charging rates without authority from the Public Service Commission (PSC), in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 146 . The information alleged he operated on a line also serviced by the authorized San Vicente Shipping Lines. The Provincial Fiscal moved to dismiss the case, arguing a subsequent PSC order had confirmed Lapu-lapu’s authority to charge increased rates, rendering the criminal case moot. The private respondent complainant opposed, contending the PSC order was not final as it was on appeal to the Supreme Court, creating a prejudicial question.
The respondent judge initially deferred the criminal hearing pending the Supreme Court’s resolution. Later, despite a renewed motion to dismiss from the Fiscal citing favorable PSC rulings, the judge denied dismissal. The judge reasoned that dismissal might lead to prescription of the criminal action and that the certiorari case was not a prejudicial question. Petitioner thus filed this petition for review, seeking the dismissal of the criminal case.

ISSUE

Whether the criminal case against petitioner should be dismissed in light of supervening administrative orders granting him provisional authority to operate and charge rates.

RULING

Yes, the criminal case must be dismissed. The Supreme Court granted the petition, ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. BO-17. The legal logic rests on the principle of mootness and the effect of supervening events from the competent administrative body. The core allegation of the information was the lack of PSC authority. However, subsequent to the filing of the case, the PSC (and later its successor, the Board of Transportation) issued orders provisionally authorizing Lapu-lapu Shipping Lines to charge the very rates in question. Crucially, the Board of Transportation’s order explicitly stated the basic application for authority was still pending final determination.
The Court found that with the grant of provisional authority by the administrative agency vested with regulatory power, there could no longer be a legal basis for the criminal charge of operating without authority. The issue had become moot and academic. The Court emphasized it would be a needless waste of judicial resources to adjudicate the powers of a defunct agency (the PSC) when the substantive matter—the authority to charge rates—was actively and provisionally resolved by the successor Board. Since petitioner was armed with provisional administrative authority, he could not be held criminally liable for the act charged. The continued prosecution, therefore, lacked merit.