GR L 35583; (September 1975) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-35583 September 30, 1975
HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch XXI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, and JOSE T. VICTORIA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL SEVENTH DIVISION), EMMANUEL G. VICTORIA, IRENEA VICTORIA, LEOCADIA G. VICTORIA and ELEONOR G. VICTORIA, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Jose T. Victoria filed a complaint for recovery of possession against private respondents. After filing their answer, the case was set for pre-trial. The initial pre-trial date was postponed multiple times due to the presiding judge’s leave, with new dates noted in court minutes by the branch clerk of court. The case was subsequently transferred to the sala of petitioner Judge Gregorio G. Pineda without notice to the private respondents or their counsel. On the final pre-trial date, October 16, 1971, neither the respondents nor their counsel appeared. Judge Pineda declared them in default, received ex parte evidence, and rendered a judgment against them. Their motion for reconsideration was denied, and execution pending appeal was granted.
Private respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which set aside the default order and subsequent proceedings. The appellate court found the default order null and void due to lack of proper notice of the pre-trial to the parties themselves. Petitioners sought a review, arguing that notice to counsel, as indicated in the court minutes, was sufficient.
ISSUE
Whether the order of default and the subsequent judgment are valid despite the lack of direct notice of the pre-trial to the parties themselves.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The legal logic is anchored on the mandatory requirement for notice of pre-trial under the Rules of Court and the constitutional right to due process. The Court emphasized that while notice to counsel is generally sufficient for ordinary hearings, a pre-trial conference is a distinct proceeding where the personal presence of the parties is indispensable. This is because a key objective of pre-trial is to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement, and counsel cannot compromise a client’s interests without special authority. The minutes of the court only indicated notification to counsel, with no showing that the parties themselves were informed of the transfer of the pre-trial date.
Consequently, the absence of the requisite notice to the parties through no fault of their own deprived them of their day in court, rendering the order of default procedurally defective and null and void. A default judgment is frowned upon, and courts must be liberal in setting aside defaults to ensure cases are fought fairly on the merits. All proceedings following the invalid default order, including the ex parte judgment and the grant of execution, were likewise void. The case was ordered returned to the trial court for proper pre-trial with notice to both counsel and the parties.