G.R. No. L-35276 September 28, 1972
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE HABEAS CORPUS OF LT. RUBEN ROY. NATIVIDAD BANAAG ROY, petitioner, vs. GIL S. FERNANDEZ, Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, Cmdr. GEORGE TEMPLO, and HONORABLE MARIANO V. AGCAOILI, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIX, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Natividad Banaag Roy filed a petition for habeas corpus seeking the release of her husband, Lt. Ruben Roy of the Philippine Coast Guard. Lt. Roy was arrested on April 17, 1972, at his office in Sangley, Cavite, and detained at the Law Enforcement Command in Manila without any formal complaint or judicial warrant. The petitioner alleged his arrest and continued confinement were unlawful. The respondents, military officers, justified the detention as a necessary security measure under military law and procedures, citing an ongoing investigation into pilferage of ammunition and firearms. They contended that habeas corpus was an improper remedy as administrative remedies were unexhausted and that military personnel were not entitled to the writ.
The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the petition on May 31, 1972. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. While the petition for review was pending, the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss, stating the case had become moot and academic. The motion indicated that a charge under the Articles of War had been filed against Lt. Roy and was under pre-trial investigation. Crucially, it also revealed that upon Lt. Roy’s own written request dated July 7, 1972, he had been restored to full duty status and released from confinement effective July 20, 1972.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been rendered moot and academic by the release of Lt. Ruben Roy from confinement.

RULING

Yes, the petition is moot and academic. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on this primary ground. The core function of a writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of a person’s detention and to secure their release if such detention is unlawful. The remedy is directed at the right to liberty. Once the restraint on liberty is removed, the writ ceases to serve its purpose. In this case, the factual record established that Lt. Roy had been completely released from confinement and restored to active duty. This unconditional release, distinct from a mere grant of bail, eliminated the actual deprivation of liberty that is the essential prerequisite for habeas corpus relief. The Court cited precedent, including Tan Me Nio vs. Insular Collector of Customs, which holds that a person released on bail is no longer entitled to the writ, a principle that applies with greater force to one fully released.
The dismissal, however, was without prejudice to any other legal rights Lt. Roy may possess. The Court explicitly noted that the mootness of the habeas corpus petition did not foreclose Lt. Roy’s right to seek other appropriate legal redress for the alleged illegality of his confinement during the period from April 17 to July 20, 1972. He remained free to pursue any separate action for damages or other remedies available under law for the purported violation of his constitutional rights during that interval. The resolution addressed only the propriety of the habeas corpus writ given the changed circumstances.