G.R. No. L-3497 May 18, 1951
THE MATTER OF THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF JOSE VENZON. VALENTINA CUEVAS, petitioner-appellee, vs. PILAR ACHACOSO, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS

Jose Venzon died on January 19, 1946, in Iba, Zambales, leaving a will executed on October 10, 1945. In this will, he instituted his widow, Valentina Cuevas, and his daughter, Rosario Asera Venzon, as his heirs, and named his widow as executrix. On February 1, 1946, Valentina Cuevas filed a petition for the probate of this will. On May 10, 1946, Pilar Achacoso filed an alternative petition for the probate of a previous will executed by the deceased, wherein she was named as an heir, praying that if the later will was rejected, the earlier one be admitted to probate. Pilar Achacoso objected to the probate of the second will. After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Zambales found the second will was executed in accordance with law and ordered it admitted to probate. Pilar Achacoso appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court as it involved purely questions of law.

ISSUE

The main issue is whether the attestation clause in the will of Jose Venzon, executed on October 10, 1945, is valid despite the clause being phrased as a declaration by the testator himself and signed by him, with the three instrumental witnesses signing below under the word “Witnesses.”

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower court, admitting the will to probate. The Court held that the attestation clause substantially complied with legal requirements. Although the clause was phrased as a declaration by the testator (“I hereby manifest…”), the fact that the three instrumental witnesses signed the will immediately under the testator’s signature showed they attested not only to the genuineness of his signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the clause. The Court cited the precedent of Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil. 378), where a similar attestation clause, forming part of the body of the will and recited by the testatrix but signed by her and the witnesses, was upheld. The Court emphasized a liberal interpretation of the laws on wills to achieve their primary purpose of preventing fraud and ensuring authenticity, without adding unnecessary requisites that would frustrate the testator’s will. The ruling was supported by the liberal principles of interpretation later embodied in the new Civil Code (Arts. 788 and 791), which, while not directly applicable, reflected the legislative intent.