G.R. No. L-3496 June 27, 1951
SINFOROSA CASTRO DAVID, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALFREDO CASTRO, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The parties entered into an agreement on April 12, 1947, to settle civil cases R-57 and R-58. Under the agreement, defendant Alfredo Castro ceded his rights in the property in case R-58 to plaintiff Sinforosa Castro, subject to conditions: (a) Alfredo could keep his house on the lot for two years rent-free; (b) after two years, Sinforosa could pay for the house or Alfredo could pay rent for the lot, but if they could not agree on reasonable rent, Alfredo should remove the house. The court rendered a decision conforming to this agreement on May 27, 1947. Sinforosa Castro, construing the agreement as allowing Alfredo to possess only the portion occupied by his house, moved for execution to obtain possession of the rest of the lot. A writ of execution was issued on July 22, 1947, ordering Alfredo to vacate the portion not occupied by his house. Alfredo Castro refused, contending he was entitled to possess the entire lot (about 400 square meters) for the two-year period. The plaintiffs filed a motion to declare him in contempt, which the trial court denied, ruling Alfredo had the right to possess the whole lot. The plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether, under the terms of the agreement, defendant Alfredo Castro is entitled to possess the entire lot containing his house for the stipulated two-year period, or only the specific portion of the lot on which his house is constructed.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s orders, holding that Alfredo Castro is entitled to possess the entire lot for the two-year period. The Court found the appellants’ theory untenable. The agreement used the word “lot” (referring to the entire parcel of about 409.62 square meters) and not “portion” or “part,” especially since the lot was not subdivided at the time of the agreement. The expressions “where it is constructed,” “wherein the house is constructed,” and “where it stands” were used to identify and distinguish the specific lot containing the appellee’s house from other lots in the settlement, not to limit his possession to the area covered by the house’s footprint. The presence of other houses on the lot not belonging to the appellee was deemed immaterial. The decisive point was that the agreement identified the lot by the presence of the appellee’s house, not by the area the house occupied. Costs were awarded against the appellants.