GR L 34030; (May, 1972) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-34030 May 31, 1972
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, petitioner, vs. HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Branch III, stationed at Dumaguete City, and ANABELLA IMPERIAL UY, respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Anabella Imperial Uy, claiming to have duly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching majority age, filed an application with the Bureau of Immigration on July 19, 1968, seeking the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and the issuance of a certificate attesting to her Filipino citizenship. After more than two years of inaction by the Commissioner of Immigration, Uy filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental to compel the Commissioner to act on her application. The Commissioner moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Uy failed to exhaust administrative remedies, as the Secretary of Justice had issued a new circular on September 7, 1970, reversing a prior ruling and authorizing the Bureau to process such applications. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, prompting the Commissioner to file the instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the mandamus petition despite the petitioner’s claim of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the trial court’s resolution, and ordered the dismissal of the mandamus case. The legal logic is anchored on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court found that under the administrative regulations in force, particularly the circular issued by the Secretary of Justice on September 7, 1970, the Bureau of Immigration was authorized to process applications for cancellation of alien registry based on an election of Philippine citizenship, subject to final action by the Department of Justice. Since this administrative avenue was available and had not been pursued by respondent Uy, her direct recourse to the courts via mandamus was premature. The Court emphasized that mandamus is only proper when there is a clear legal duty to perform an act and all administrative remedies have been exhausted. Here, the administrative process provided a plain and adequate remedy. The Court noted that while there are exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, such as when the issue is purely legal, the circumstances did not warrant their application, especially since the new circular offered a clear path for administrative resolution. The pendency of the court action was the very impediment to the Commissioner acting on the application.