GR L 33366; (October, 1972) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-33366 October 30, 1972
EVER ICE DROP and ICE CREAM FACTORY, YUSAY CHOO, CHUA BOK KIAN, ONG HOC GAN, and TAN TIA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUCILA PONCE VDA. DE RAMOS, et al., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners, comprising the second group of defendants in a damages case, jointly appealed a trial court judgment with another group of defendants. Their counsel, Atty. Job Mariano, filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond on June 11, 1970, and was granted an extension to submit the record on appeal. He subsequently filed a petition to adopt the record on appeal already submitted by counsel for the first group of defendants, which the trial court allowed on the condition that petitioners’ notice of appeal be incorporated therein. The original, typewritten record on appeal complied with this condition.
However, the printed joint record on appeal filed with the Court of Appeals omitted petitioners’ notice of appeal. Consequently, the printed version failed to show on its face the date petitioners received the decision, a requisite under Section 6, Rule 41 to establish the timeliness of the appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’ appeal based on this omission, citing mandatory procedural rules.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal due to the omission of the petitioners’ notice of appeal from the printed joint record on appeal, when the original record on appeal on file contained the necessary data showing the appeal was perfected on time.
RULING
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, ordering the appellate court to proceed with the appeal on its merits. The legal logic centers on a substantive, non-technical interpretation of procedural rules to serve justice. While Section 1, Rule 50 authorizes dismissal for failure to show timeliness on the face of the record, and Section 6, Rule 41 prohibits alterations in the printed record, these provisions cannot be applied to sanction a dismissal based on a mere printing error.
The Court held that the prohibition against alterations or omissions in the printed record refers to intentional, substantive changes, not unintentional errors of the printing press. It was undisputed that the original, typewritten record on appeal—which remained on file with the Court of Appeals—contained the incorporated notice of appeal and demonstrated the appeal’s timeliness. The omission was a clerical mishap in the printing process, not a failure by the appellants to perfect their appeal within the reglementary period. The appellees also failed in their duty under the rules to timely object to the incompleteness of the printed record.
Under these circumstances, a rigid, technical application of the rules would be inequitable. The paramount objective is to afford a review on the merits where a bona fide attempt to appeal has been made and the original record substantiates compliance. The Court, considering it a first instance of this nature and in the interest of justice, opted for a liberal construction to prevent a mere printing oversight from depriving petitioners of their right to appeal.
