GR L 33216; (June, 1983) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-33216 June 28, 1983
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF TAN CHING TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES: TAN CHING, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS
Tan Ching, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization in 1959. The Court of First Instance of Quezon granted his petition in a decision dated December 20, 1960, admitting him to Philippine citizenship subject to the conditions under Republic Act No. 530 . The law required a two-year probationary period before the decision could become final, during which the applicant must not leave the country, must maintain a lawful livelihood, and must have no criminal or prejudicial acts on record. After this period, a final hearing was necessary for the court to confirm compliance before the applicant could take the oath.
However, Tan Ching filed his motion to be declared qualified to take his oath of allegiance only in June 1970, more than nine years after the 1960 decision. The Solicitor General opposed, arguing the delay constituted an abandonment of his petition. The lower court conducted hearings where Tan Ching presented evidence, including income tax returns from 1965 to 1969, to prove his continuous lawful occupation as a copra buyer and his compliance with all other statutory conditions. The court granted his motion in an Order dated August 26, 1970, prompting the Republic to appeal.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether Tan Ching’s nine-year delay in moving to take his oath of allegiance constitutes an abandonment of his naturalization petition. A secondary issue is whether he satisfactorily proved he had dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling, as required by law.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the lower court’s order. On the issue of delay, the Court found the explanation reasonable. Tan Ching demonstrated he had not abandoned his petition; he had repeatedly approached his former counsel after the two-year period but faced difficulties in securing legal representation without incurring excessive costs. The Court held that such a delay, when adequately explained and not indicative of disinterest, does not automatically equate to abandonment, especially where the applicant has continuously resided in the Philippines and maintained good conduct.
Regarding the continuous lawful calling, the Republic argued that Tan Ching failed to present his income tax returns for 1961 to 1964 and that his presented returns showed fluctuating annual income, suggesting an insufficient livelihood. The Court rejected this. First, the absence of the earlier returns was due to the fiscal’s own statement at the hearing that taxpayers are only required to keep records for five years, implying no objection to their non-presentation. Second, the evidence showed consistent, albeit variable, annual income from his copra business. The Court emphasized that the law requires a “lawful calling,” not necessarily a “lucrative” one. Given his residence in a small town with a low cost of living and the absence of proof he became a public charge, his occupation as a copra buyer satisfied the statutory requirement. Thus, having complied with all conditions under R.A. No. 530 , Tan Ching was rightly allowed to take his oath.
