GR L 33171; (May, 1979) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-33171. May 31, 1979.
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch, ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
FACTS
Petitioner Porfirio P. Cinco filed a civil case for damages in the City Court of Mandaue City, arising from a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and owned by the Pepitos. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against Hilot based on the same incident. During the civil case pre-trial, respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the criminal case’s final resolution, citing Rule 111, Section 3(b) of the Rules of Court. The City Court granted the suspension.
Cinco filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, arguing the City Judge gravely abused his discretion. The CFI dismissed the petition, ruling that the suspension was proper as damage to property did not justify an independent civil action, and certiorari was an improper remedy against an interlocutory order. Cinco’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this Petition for Review.
ISSUE
Whether an independent civil action for damage to property based on quasi-delict can proceed during the pendency of a criminal action arising from the same incident.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the CFI decision and ordering the City Court to proceed with the civil case. The Court clarified that petitioner’s complaint was fundamentally based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, alleging fault and negligence by the driver and vicarious liability of the vehicle owners. Article 2177 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that responsibility from fault or negligence (quasi-delict) is entirely separate and distinct from civil liability arising from a crime.
The civil action subject to mandatory suspension under Rule 111, Section 3(b) is only that which arises from the criminal offense itself. A civil action based on quasi-delict, being an obligation not arising from the act complained of as a felony under Article 31 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently regardless of the criminal proceedings. The Court emphasized that the concept of quasi-delict under Article 2176 includes damage to property, not merely injuries to persons. Therefore, the lower courts erred in suspending the civil action. The ruling on this central issue rendered the discussion of other assigned errors unnecessary.