G.R. No. L-32917 July 18, 1988
JULIAN S. YAP, petitioner, vs. HON. SANTIAGO O. TAÑADA, etc., and GOULDS PUMPS INTERNATIONAL (PHIL.), INC., respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from a complaint for sum of money filed by Goulds Pumps against Julian Yap in the City Court of Cebu. Yap was declared in default for failure to appear at a pre-trial conference in the Court of First Instance on appeal. The trial court rendered a default judgment ordering Yap to pay Goulds the principal amount, interest, and attorney’s fees. Yap filed a motion for reconsideration of the default order, which was denied. Goulds then moved for execution, which the court granted. Yap contested the execution, arguing the judgment was not yet final because his motion for reconsideration had interrupted the appeal period. The trial court and later the Court of Appeals rejected his contention, leading to the execution sale of his property. Yap elevated the case to the Supreme Court via certiorari, challenging the orders denying his motions to set aside the execution sale and to quash the alias writ of execution.
Yap’s core argument was that his motion for reconsideration of the default judgment, though not verified or accompanied by an affidavit of merit, was valid under Rule 37 and thus suspended the period for appeal, preventing the judgment from becoming final and executory. He asserted that the subsequent execution was therefore premature and void. He also sought to prove damages from alleged irregularities in the execution process.

ISSUE

The primary issue was whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution and in denying Yap’s motions to set aside the execution sale, based on the determination that Yap’s motion for reconsideration was pro forma and did not toll the reglementary period for appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the challenged orders. The Court held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic centered on the nature of a pro forma motion. The Court ruled that Yap’s motion for reconsideration of the default judgment was indeed pro forma. A motion for reconsideration must point out specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or are contrary to law. Yap’s initial motion merely reiterated his desire for an amicable settlement and a chance to present his defenses without such specification. Consequently, it did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal. The judgment thus became final and executory after Yap failed to perfect a timely appeal.
Regarding the lack of an affidavit of merit, the Court clarified that while a motion to set aside an order of default under Rule 38 requires such an affidavit, a motion for reconsideration of a judgment by default under Rule 37 does not strictly require one. However, the fatal flaw was the motion’s pro forma character. Since the judgment had attained finality, its execution was a matter of right. The Court also found no merit in Yap’s claim for damages from the execution, as the execution proceedings were regular and the judgment debtor’s property was properly levied upon and sold at public auction to satisfy the final judgment.