G.R. No. L-32506 July 30, 1979
DOMINADOR BERMISA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. VICENTE SANTIAGO, JR., and ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL PROCULO L. VIERNES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Dominador Bermisa was charged with Frustrated Murder before the Municipal Court of San Manuel, Pangasinan, on May 8, 1963. After preliminary proceedings, an Information was filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan, Tayug Branch, on November 26, 1963. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty on December 22, 1964. On June 2, 1965, the prosecution moved for provisional dismissal due to the non-appearance of its witnesses. The trial court, noting the case had been pending for nearly two years, issued an order dismissing the case provisionally “with the consent of the accused and his counsel.”
After a lapse of over four years, on September 10, 1969, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed a new Information for the same offense in the CFI of Pangasinan, Urdaneta Branch. Before arraignment, Bermisa moved to quash the new Information, arguing that the long delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial and warranted final dismissal under the doctrines of Conde v. Rivera and Kalaw v. Apostol. The trial judge denied the motion to quash on March 3, 1970, and Bermisa was arraigned over his objection. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied his petition for certiorari and prohibition, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the provisional dismissal of the first case and the refiling after over four years violated petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, warranting the final dismissal of the criminal charge.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that no violation of the right to a speedy trial occurred. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of the initial dismissal and the petitioner’s own conduct. The right to a speedy trial is designed to prevent oppressive and capricious delays. However, the first case was dismissed provisionally with the express consent of the accused and his counsel. The Court ruled that if an accused believes a provisional dismissal deprives him of a speedy trial, he must object to it at the time and insist on a trial on the merits. By consenting, the petitioner waived any immediate claim that the delay was oppressive.
Furthermore, the refiling of the case was legally permissible. A provisional dismissal is not an acquittal; it does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, provided the crime has not prescribed. The crime of Frustrated Murder prescribes in twenty years. The period from the provisional dismissal in June 1965 to the refiling in September 1969 was approximately four years, which was well within the prescriptive period. Therefore, the revival of the case did not contravene the rules on prescription. The doctrines in Conde and Kalaw were found inapplicable as those cases involved delays attributable to the prosecution without the accused’s consent, unlike here where the accused acquiesced to the provisional dismissal. The Court concluded that the delay was not vexatious, capricious, or oppressive under the circumstances.