G.R. No. L-3174

FACTS:
On January 25, 1906, Harry J. Finnick was served with a subpoena duces tecum issued by Judge Manuel Araullo of the Court of First Instance of Manila, commanding him to appear as a witness in a criminal case for estafa (United States vs. Nicolasa Pascual) and to produce certain books and articles of jewelry. Finnick appeared in court, testified, and produced the books, but refused to produce the jewelry, stating he believed the court had no legal authority to require it and that parting with possession would be prejudicial to his interests. Judge Araullo then ordered Finnick imprisoned until he complied. Finnick’s exceptions and request for bail pending appeal were denied. He subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before Associate Justice A. C. Carson, who ordered his discharge. The sheriff, James J. Peterson, appealed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Court of First Instance had the authority to issue a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of personal property (jewelry) as evidence; and
2. Whether Finnick’s refusal to produce the jewelry constituted a contempt committed “in the presence of the court,” warranting summary punishment.

RULING:
1. Yes, the court had the authority. Section 402 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions authorizes a subpoena duces tecum to require a witness to bring “any books, documents, or other things under his control, which he is bound by law to produce in evidence.” The phrase “other things” is not limited to books and documents but includes personal property like jewelry, especially in light of Article 120 of the Penal Code, which obligates courts to order restitution of property in criminal cases. The subpoena was valid.
2. No, the contempt was not committed “in the presence of the court.” Finnick’s contempt consisted of his disobedience to the command of the subpoena duces tecum itself, not to any subsequent verbal order of the judge during the trial. Since the contempt was not committed in the court’s immediate view and presence, it was not a direct contempt punishable summarily under Section 231 of the Code. Finnick was entitled to the procedural safeguards under Sections 232 to 240, including notice, hearing, and the right to appeal. Therefore, his summary imprisonment was illegal.

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the order of Associate Justice Carson discharging Finnick from custody.